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Radioactive Waste Management
Potentials and l~zards from a Risk Point of View
Abstract
The problems of radioactive waste management are addressed in
this paper. The magnitude of the problem i8 identified as pri-
marily concerns the Federal Republic of Germany. Predictions
are includedof the characteristics of the wastes from the
various activities of the nuclear fuel cycle, and their accu-
mulationasa function of time until the year 2010. An im-
portant reactor types are considered.
The methods for the evaluation of risk are reviewed as weIl as
possible extensions of the methods needed to evaluate risk from
radioactive waste management strategies. For input to risk eva-
luation a hazard index for radioactive isotopes is established
and calculated for fuelreprocessing wastes from several reac-
tor types.
proposed1.7ast:emanagement strategies are reviewed and their poten-
tials, in terms of risk reductioil, are identified. An attempt is
made to place the segtnentsof the waste management strategies con-
tributing to risk in perspective.
Further effortand a refinement of the work in the area cf radio-
active waste management evaluation is proposed and outlined.
") 1 c=: , n.., I.
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Die Handhabung radioaktiven Abfalls
Strategien und Risiken
Kurzfassung
In diesem Bericht werden die Probleme des ~adioaktivenAbfalls,
wie sie sich vor allem für die BRD stellen, behandelt.
Eingeschlossen sind Voraussagen über die Zusammensetzung des Ab-
falls in den verschiedenen Teilbereichen des Brennstoffzyklus und
die zu erwartenden Gesamtmengen bis hin zum Jahr 2010. Die Betrach-
tung erstreckt sich auf alle Reaktortypen.
Der Bericht bringt sowohl eine Ubersicht über die Methoden der Ri-
sikoberechnung als auch eine Darstellung möglicher Erweiterungen
dieser Methoden auf Abfallstrategien. Als Eingangsgröße der Risiko-
berechnung wird ein Gefahren-Index (hazard index) radioaktiver Iso-
tope definiert und für den radioaktiven Abfall der Wiederaufarbei-
tung von Brennstoff verschiedener Reaktortypen berechnet.
EseI'f61gt eine Gegenüberstellung der vorgeschlagenen Abfallhand-
habungsstrategien insbesondere im Hinblick auf eine mögliche Ver-
ringerung der damit verbundenen Risiken. Außerdem wird versucht,
die Teilbereiche einer Strategie zu beurteilen.
Weitere BeMÜhungen auf dem Gebiet der Abfallhandhabung werden vor-
geschlagen und skizziert.
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I. Introduction
The disposal of any type of hazardous material, whether it be nuc-
lear or non-nuclear, should involve the permanent removal of the
material from man's biosphere. This can beaccomplished either by
converting the hazardous material to nonhazardous material or by
disposing of the material in such a manner that it can not reenter
man's environment. However, most present day schemes for the dis-
posal of hazardous material can not guarantee, nor do they pretend
to guarantee, permanent removal of the material. As it has almost
universally been practiced to date the answer to the question of
how to dispose of wastes is that "dilution is the solution of pol-
lution". This type of solution to waste disposal is being rejected
presently, with due justification, and in the near future it will
be totally unacceptable due to physical and biologieallimitations
of our planet. It is, therefore, imperative that we find and utiiize
waste disposai systems whieh can guarantee, with reasonable assurance,
the safety of man's biosphere. The safety of man's biosphere refers
to the prevention of any undesirable change in the physieal, ehemical,
or biologicai charaeteristies of the air, land, and water that may
or will harmfully affeet human life or that of other desirable species.
The disposal of radioaetive wastes has assoeiated with itspecial
problems not eneountered with other hazardous materials. !hat is,
the damaging influence of the radioaetive material to a biological
system can be aeeomplished without incorporation into the system,
or direet contaet with the system. Since the radioactivity of the
material i8 an intrinsie property the hazard assoeiated with it can
only be neutralized through the very diffieult proeess of nuelear
transmutation. In addition, mankind is partieularly sensitive to
the menace of radiation. He is prepared to accept hazards from
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industrial and domestic accidents and from natural disasters which
he is not willing to suffer from nuclear radiation. While this may
seem illogical, it is not a point to be argued against but rather
should be taken into due regard when considering disposal systems
for radioactive wastes.
In our considerations of radioactive waste disposal systems that
follows we have logically divided the systems into three separate
categories. These are
1) ultimate disposal
2) long-term disposal, and
3) storage.
A basic explanation of each of these three categories is in order.
We use the words "ultimate disposal ll in the sense that after dis-
posal of the waste has been successfully accomplished it is im-
possible for it to return to manls biosphere. We are referring to
disposal by nuclear transmutation and deep space disposal. Long-
term disposal refers to disposal on the earth in such a manner
that the waste is nonretrievable. While the purposed schemes
claim a high degree of safety it is conceivable that under cer-
tain conditions the waste may return, in an uncontrollable manner,
to manls biosphere. Two of themethods considered for long-term
disposal are disposal as solids in salt mines or under the
Antarctica ice cap. The distinction between lang-term disposal
and storage is that the wastes are retrievable from storage and
therefore require perpetual care. For example, the wastes may be
stored as solids in man-made vaults or as liquids in tanks.
As will be naticed, to some extent slightly more emphasis in this
paper is plaeed on the long=term disposal concept of solidified
wastes in salt deposits than the other concepts. The reason is
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that this concept has been the most appealing and intensively
studied to date in the BRD. Therefore, the possible appearance
of such a long-term disposal facility and the safety problems
associated with the concept are better defined. This does not
mean that we preclude the other waste disposal concepts from
serious consideration - on the contrary.
Ourprimary concern in this paperis the radioactive wastes from
spent fuel reprocessing which represent, on a curie or hazard
base, 99% of the radioactive wastes generated in the nuclear fuel
cycle. The waste generated from other portions of the nuclear fuel
cyc1e present a problem primarily because of its volume. We con-
cern ourselves here with wastes whose dominating property is its
intense radioactivity.
Finally, it must be clearly stated that this paper does not offer
solutions to the problem of radioactive waste management. Rather
the intent is to outline the general problem, illustrate its
magnitude and importance, and serve as a preliminary report of
the activities performed in this field. In addition, means by
which the various waste disposal procedures can be evaluated
and compared in a realistic fashion are described. The approach
is from a risk point of view. This paper is also intended to
serve as a guide for future efforts in this field by pointing
out the important and govering aspects of the problem.
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11. Definition of Problem
To assess the magnitude and importance of the problem of radio-
active waste management it is necessary to start with a descrip-
tion of the nuclearfuel cycle, the functions of its various
components, and the characteristic types of waste generation.
Of equal importance is an estimate of the amount of the waste
generated as a function of time.
These problems are handled here by first describing the uranium/
plutonium nuclear fuel cycle and its operation with associated
wastes. An estimate of the contribution of nuclear energy to the
total electrical energy generation in the BRD is also provided.
With these estimates the amount of waste generated is calculated.
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A. ~uclear Fuel Cyele
Associated with the production of energy, whether it be from fossil or
nuclear fuel, is the problem of wastes from the energy production and its
burden on man's biosphere. The waste problem encompasses the entire speetrum
of activities in the generation of nuclearenergy as in other types of
energy systems. It begins with the tailings of uranium mining and is
prevalent through the steps of fuel manufacturing, reaetor operation, fuel
reproeessing, and finally nuelear facility decommissioning at the end of
their economic life.
To assess the waste problem from such an energy generating system it is 1m-
perative that one considers the entire system as an entity in itself and not
treat the individual processes separately. The reason for such a eonsidera-
tion is elementary in systems analysis. Since the individual processes in
the energy system are intimately interconneeted,a change in one proeess is
refl.ected by subsequent alterations in one or more of the other processes •
Our nuclear energy generating system as it is presently operating, or envi-
sioned for the near future, is shown in Fig.l. In the followingwe shall
discuss eaeh stage of the energy system and the type of waste associated
with each.
(i) Uranium Mining and Milling
The principal radioisotope hazard to man within a uranium mine is radon,with
its radioactive deeay products. In addition to radon, mine air may eontain
radium and other toxie eonstituents of the ore such as arsenie, cobalt,
vanadium, and selenium. Even after the eommereial ore has been removed, the
walls of the mine continue to emanate radon due to the presenee of low-grade
ores.
The end produets of milling are uranium eoneentrate (U30S) and " ta ilings".
The tailings. eontain most of the radium originally present in the ore. Sinee
radium is one of the most toxie of all radioaetive elements, its represents
a serious potential hazard. Water draining from tailings ponds usually
eontains more soluble radium than permissible in drinking water. It is
neeessary, therefore, to see that this ~ater does not eontaminate public
supplies •
- n -
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It should be mentioned that wastes similar to those found in uranium
mining and milling oeeur also in thorium extraetion. The produets of
thorium deeay are believed to be somewhat more toxie than those from
uranium.
(ii) Proeessing of Uranium (Conversion to
Hexafluoride and Isotopie Enriehment)
The wastes from these processes are very similar to those produced
bythe uranium mills. However, the amount of radium in the coneen-
trate is so small that oxide proeessing and isotope enriehment under
normal eircumstances seldom produee hazardous wastes. An accident or
sabotage in an isotope enrichment plant can result, however, in the
formation of large quantities of fission products if a subsequent
criticality accident oceurs.
The waste from the production of uranium meta1 by reducing uranium
tetrafluoride with powdered magnesium at high temperatures eontains
a small amount of uranium.
(iii) Fuel Fabrication
Normal wastes from fuel fabrication consist of uranium or uranium
oxide in the form of dust, metal turnings and scrap, and eladding
materials or other objects eontaminated with uranium. Clearing ma-
terials, proteetive elothing, filters, and wash water must also be
eonsidered.
Sinee uranium is valuable, any large amount will be recovered, but
recovery procedures themselves may produce wastes. Drainage from
fuel fabrication plants eontain suspended and dissolved uranium.
(iv) Nuclear Power Reaetor Operation
Wastes arising in normal reactor operation vary considerably with
different designs. It is within the reactor itself that 99% of the
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total radioactivity of all wastes, associated with the generation of nuc-
lear energy, are produced (fission products). Under normal conditions this
waste is under control and is held within the fuel element by the fuel clad-
ding. However, some fission product gases may be vented or significant quan-
tities released by rupture of the fuel cladding.
Normal operation maintenance will produce radioactive items such as pumps,
valves, piping, tanks and parts of the internal reactor mechanism. The de-
contamination center will produce used cleaning fluids, mops and rags. In
all reactors unwanted impurities occur in the coolant, resulting generally
in induced reactivity. To combat the buildup of radioactivity in the cool-
ant, part of the coolant is bled to waste and replaced with pure coolant.
In the use of ion-exchange columns to cleanse the coolant highly radioac-
tive resins, and strong salt solutions arising from the regeneration of
the resins, are produced.
Radioactive gases are emitted from reactor stacks even if the effluent is
passed through the best of filters and scrubbing systems. The concentra-
tion of the isotopes is dependent on the reactor type but the effluents
. 85 131 133 3 .generally contaln Kr, I, Xe and H. An accldent, or act of sabo-
tage, can result in the release of large quantities of radioactive nuclides.
(v) Irradiated Fuel Reprocessing
The type of waste produced dependsupon the design of the fuel, the method
used for dissolving the fuel, and the particular processing system employed.
Volatile fission products are released at the time of dissolutionof the
fuel. Tritium is largely oxidized and stays with the process water, going
out with the low-level aqueous effluent. The volatile radioisotope iodine
is largely scrubbed out of the process off-gas although some is released
to the environment. The radioactive noble gases are released with the gas-
eous plant effluent. The low-level liquid waste contains, in addition to
tritium, small concentrations of fission products which are carried over
by entrainment in the various evaporation steps.
In present day light water reactors approximately 0,9 kg ofnon-gaseous fis-
sion products result from each 1000 MWD of thermal energy produced. In addi-
tion, transuranium and transplutonium elements (americium, curium, neptunium,
etc.) and plutonium (as a waste loss) are present in the waste to the extent
of approximately 0,02 kg/l000 MWD of thermal energy.
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(vi) Waste Treatment and Intermediate
Storage
Interim storage of radioactive waste is usually done with the waste in
liquid form in steel tanks. Releases to the environment here result from
leakage during handling or rupture of the tanks. The solidification of
the wastes by pot calcination, spray solidification, phosphate-glass so-
lidification. or fluidized-bed solidification do not return 100% of the
fission product activity to the principal solid product from the process.
A low-levelaqueous waste liquid remains, which must be treated in a se-
parate system, and some of the radioactive elements are released with
an effluent gas stream.
The potential for sabotage at this point in the system is great, result-
ing in the release of millions of curies of fission products.
(vii) Waste Disposal
This point in the energy system will be discussed at great lengths in
this paper and does not need to be expanded upon here. It should be men-
tioned that presently there is no agreed upon method for disposal of
high-level radioactive wastes.
(viii) Plutonium Conversion and
Plutonium Fuel Fabrication
The waste problems that are encountered here are similar to these present-
ed under points (ii) and (iii) except that plutonium replaces uranium in
the waste stream with its associated greater hazard. As a result the volume
of waste which must be properly handled increases tremendously over that
resulting in the fabrication of uranium fuel elements.
(ix) Radioisotope Preparation and Use
Hospitals and biological laboratories give rise to special types of waste
mainly containing radionuclides with short half-lives. The most hazardous
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wastes result from rupture of large sealed sources. The highest level
wastes arising from the isotope production industry consist of spent
multi-curie sources.
(x) Decommissioning
The waste problems in decommissioning of a reactor and other facilities
of the nuclear fuel cycle at the end of their economic lives are the in-
duced radioactive structural materials and possibly reactor coolant, as
weIl as contaminated parts. This particular area in the energy system
has received very little attention to date, but will require concentrated
efforts to solve the possible problems present here.
(xi) Transportation
Transportation of radioactive material is involved at every stage of
the nuclear energy generating system. For example, for a 1000 MWe
pressurized water reactor the transportation requirements in terms
of tons per year are /1/:
85,500 tons O~
162 11 U308
203 11 TTFu 6
53 11 ENRICHED UF6
36 11 FUEL
36 " SPENT FUEL
4 11 SOLID WASTE
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Up to the point where spent fuel is shipped from the reactor, the
transportation problems are relatively simple. However, an accident
with spent fuel in transportation can represent significant hazards.
If instead our entire system is considered as a "nuclear park" the
transportation problem and its associated sabotage potential, are
relaxed, but other problems may arise.
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has recently compiled a comprehen-
sive report /2/ on the nuclear fuel cycle and its operation and wastes.
Included is all pertinent data such as, energy, water, air, and ma-
terials(or raw products) needed in the fuel cycle,normalized to the
needs of a "model" 1000 MWe LW power plant.
The areas of the fuel cycle involving potential environmental impacts
of significance are:
1) routine effluents of radioactivity from nucleaf power
plants and fuel reprocessing facilities
2) transportation of irradiated fuel from reactor to
reprocessing facility, and radioactive wastes from
reprocessing facility to disposal area
3) the disposal of radioactive wastes.
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ß. Nuclear Energy Predictions (1970 - 2010 in the BRD)
For the purpose of predicting energy generation over aperiod of 40 years
one needs to understand the parameters which influence the rate of energy
generation. At best most of these parameters are presently poorly under-
stood and seme totally unknc~~. Most so-called energy de~~nd studies are
basically just extrapolations of historical trends in energy consumptions.
There is, however, no established reason to believe that future energy
needs are necessarily determined by extrapolations of historical energy
consumptions trends. In a review by the V.S. House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs /3/ of 35 federal agency reports on the es timate of
future energy consumption it is stated that, in general, in these 35 pre-
dictions all used similar projection techniques and data, similar assump-
tions were made, and not surprisingly, similar results were obtained. One
notable conclusion was, however, that most recent studies tend to have
higher forecast values, reflecting the higher energy consumption rates of
the last ten years which earlier studies were unable to incorporate into
their calculations of trends. This has also been found to be true in
projections of nuclear power /4/.
As a point cf reference electrical energy today accounts for approximately
25% of the total energy consumption in the BRD /5/. The remaining 75% of the
total energy consump~ion is divided just about evenly between residential and
commercial, industrial, and transportation. The average growth rate per
year of total energy consumption from 1950 to 1970 was 4.97. in the BRD.
The average growth rate per year of electrical energy production from
1960 to 1970 was 7.9%. This leads to the obvious conclusion that the por-
tion electrical energy in the total energy consumption will be increasing
from its present 25%. Predictions for the BRD show that by the end of the
century electrical energy will have risen to about 50% of the total energy
production /5/, /6/.
If one estimates that 80 to 85% of the electrical energy generation will
be from nuclear power by the year 2000, slightly more than 40% of the total
energy consumption will be from nuclear sourees. There is a very good
possibility that by the year 2000 the high-temperature reactors will be
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providing process heat for the chemical and iron industries to the extent
of approximately 3% of the total energy consumption. This would bring the
nuclear portion to about 43% of the total energy production.
The above remarks serve to put the energy production and i ts prediction
into a proper frame of reference. It is not the goal of this work to pre-
dict what the futureenergy consumptiort will be, but rather to assess ul=
timately the possible environmenta1 impact of the nuclear fuel cycle wastes.
For this reason the results of a study /7/ performed for this same purpose
are used in this work. The results were calculated as a band into which the
future energy consumption will possibly fall. The installed electrical
generating capacity, total and nuclear, from /7/ are shown in Fig. 2. For
details concerning the basis of the curves reference should be made to
Ref. /7/.
1000 r---.---~------------,---- -- ~----_._-~-~-------~-- .,---~-------~--~~-----~ ~,---~-------_·------·-·-------------·-~l
-~
/'
2000 yeor 201019901980"1970
~---~.~-- --l
21 ; +~-- .--+-~ ~~--------~----j
I
.--_1
o.C\\'i
I ~~~9A'~~üc.\eo.~ 9°
-- I I ~ -j
5
I101 /; I I
500I----------~-~·~----+
100 t------~
200 I +---- -~------~-----~
Fig. 2 Instolled Electricol Generating Copacity and Nuclear Power in the BRD
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C. Radioactive Waste Production
In the various components, or stages , of the nuclear fuel cycle as
described in section A, there are three main components which generate
significant amounts of radioactive wastes. The three main components
are fuel fabrication (both uranium and plutonium), nuclear power reactor
operation, and irradiated fuel reprocessing. These three components are
discussed separately below, in particular as they apply to the situation
in the BRD. For the calculations of the radioactive waste production the
nuclear energy estimates, as presented in Fig. 2 of this report from
Ref. /7/, were used. Rather than using the band of the estimates given,
the mean or middle value was taken, as given in Table 1 beiow. In addi-
tion, the share of the light water and fast breeder reactors in the total
installed nuclear capacity is given. For the calculation of this division
of the reactors it was assumed that the light water reactor would cover
the installed capacity totally up to 1987, after which time fast breeder
reactors are built at a rate determined by the availability of plutonium
in the BRD from its own nuclear industry.
The amount of fuel fabrication and reprocessing werk required for this
reactor strategy was calculated in Ref. 17/. The results are given here
in Fig. 3 and 4. In addition, the yearly production of plutonium from
both the light water and fast breeder reactors is shown in Fig. 5.
Table 1: Estimated Growth of Nuclear Power in the BRD (GWe)
Year Nuclear Installed LWR l ) LMFBR2)Capacity
1970 1 1
1975 9 9
1980 20 20
1985 36 36
1990 63 60 3
1995 105 91 14
2000 155 123 32
2005 232 173 59
2010 316 216 100
i) LWR: Light water thermal reactors consisting of 50% pressur-
ized water reactors and 50% boiling water reactors.
2) LMFBR: Liquidmetal fast breeder reactor,sodium cooled and
oxide plutonium fuei.
- ]1) -
9 x 103t / year
1
..... _.. -- .... _._-----+_._-._.~--- --- -_.-
---~-----~~+----~-
.._--~---. --------~____,IlI'4_-----~__+_-~--2
11-:--~-------+--c--7!fI1C--------t--- LMPBR (core only )......::--::;~~I
I
4 --------~----------\-------,;"-------+--- ----------j
3 ------------+-------r-~IL------___t____----____1
6 --- ..... --~~--+--------------+-----~
5
7
8
1980 1990 2000 year 2010
Fig. 3 Annual Fuel Fabrication Requirements
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Fig. 5 Annual Plutonium Production
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The reactor data used in the calculations are representative of current
designs and are listed in Ref. 17/. In these calculations it was assumed
that 50i. of the light water reactors are pressurized water reactors and
50% boiling water reactors.
Cl. Fuel Fabrication Wastes
The solid wastes generated at fuel fabrication plants consist primarily
of paper, plastic, gloves, and other wastes contaminated with low-level
uranlUID or plutonium. The liquid wastes generated are solidified and
package for disposal. The estimated low-level wastes from the fabrica-
tion of fuel are
5.9 3 (uranium fuel)LWR: m/ton fuel
11.8 m Iton fuel (plutonium recycle fuel)
LMFBR: 9.7 m3/ton fuel (plutonium fuel)
C2. Nuclear Power Plant Wastes
During the operation of nuclear power reactors gaseous. liquid. and solid
wastes are produced. However, the amount and composition varies consider-
ably with reactor type and even among reactors of the same type. A signi-
ficant portion of the wastes generated at the nuclear power plant are re-
leased to the environment immediately,or after a short delay time. The
radioactivity in the released wastes is so diluted that it is not believed
to represent a hazard to the general population.
The gaseous wastes from the reactor result from the leakage of gaseous fis-
sion products from the fuel. In some incidents radioactive gas removal sys-
tems are used to collect the escaping gas. The amou~t (volume) collected
over a year of operation is generally not large. For example, for the LMFBR
it is estimated that in one year less than 50 liters of 85Kr will be col-
lected /8/.
The low- and medium-level liquid wastes generated at the reactor are treated
to remove radioactivity by methods such as evaporation or ion exchange. The
concentrate containing the radioisotopes are solidified and stored as solid
wastes.
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Solid wastes typically consist of filters, laboratory and liquid waste
treatment residues, contaminated tools, parts and wastes such as plastic
bags, foot covers, paper towels and protective clothing. This waste is
compacted, or incinerated, and packaged for burial.
The amount of solid or semi-solid waste, from light water reactors after
dewatering but before treatment and packaging, have a rather wide range
of values. Typically they are as given in the following table.
Table 2 Light Water Reactor Solid Wastes from Reactor Operation 191
Waste Type Vol. (m3 /yr) Activity (c:urie/m3)
BWR:
spent res ins 5.6 - 11.2 < 7
sludges (condensate
clean-up filters, 22 - 64 3.5 - 70
clean~up-systems)
rw"'R: i
spent res ins 4.8 - 7 175 - 3500
evaporator bottoms 1.4 - 4.2 < 35 i
I
140 - 280 m3/year
50 - 80 m3/year
BWR:
PWR:
The medium-level wastes are generally fixed in concrete and packaged in
drums, each of about 55 gallons (US), or 0.21 m3, capacity. The low-level
wastes are not fixed in any inert material. Therefore, for 1000 MWe reac-
tor plants the following volumes of low- and medium-level package wastes
are generated
Since to date there has not existed a large commercial fast breeder reac-
tor, it is difficult to estimate reliably the volume of wastes. The esti-
mates for a 1000 MWe LMFBR 181 are, for packaged solid low- and medium-
level wastes, LMFBR:
For the high-temperature gas cooled reactors of the 1000 MWe size the
volume of wastes would be expected to be, extrapolated from the Fort
St. Vrain HTGR reactor
HTGR: 'I" 33 m3/year.
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C3. Fuel Reprocessing Wastes
The bulk of the very hazardous radioactive wastes generated ln the nuc-
lear fuel cycle are produced at the reprocessing plant. The wastes are
generated ln gaseous, liquid, and solid form. Much of the gaseous waste
is presently released from the facility almest immediately after the
spent fuel is reprocessed. The gaseous wastes consist primarily of the
noble fission product gases. Solid wastes from the reprocessing plant
include fuel cladding hulis and other fuel element parts, and low-level
wastes similar to that genera ted at the reactor (laboratory wastes, small
tools, gloves and clothing).
The reprocessing of the fuel is a liquid process from which 99% of the
uranium and plutonium present is removed. After some volume reduction
the high-level wastes, which contain 99% of the fission products and
actinides of the original spent fuel element, are stored in stainless
steel tanks before further treatment. The medium-level wastes generated
are the spent contaminated chemical agents used in the reprocessing,
off-gas scrubbing agents and solutions from decontamination operations.
In addition, it is estimated that something of the order of 50% of the
plutonium loss to waste during the fuel reprocessing ends up in the
medium-level wastes.
The volumes of wastes from fuel reprocessing, per ton of spent fuel,
are given in Table 3. From the estimated growth of nuclear energy in
the BRD, given in Table 1, the estimated production of high-level
wastes are given in Table 4.
Table 3: Wastes from Fuel Reprocessing Plant per Ton Fuel
LWR LMFBR
High-level liquid, m3 0.6-1.0 0.6-1 .0
Convertion of high-level liquid 80-100 80-}00
waste to solid, liters
Cladding hulls and ether fuel 0.3-0.6 O. 5-} .0
element parts, m3
Medium-level liquid
'"
3.0
'"
3.0(concentrates), m3
Low-level solid wastes, m3 0.6-4.0 2.4-}5.0
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Table 4: Estimated Production of High-Level Fuel Reprocessing Wastes ~n the BRD
1980 1990 2000 20 IU
Installed Capaci,ty, G'i\'e 20 63 155 316
Amount of Fuel t) • 1).,eprocess~ng ,
tons/years:
LHR 356 1232 2838 5224
Ll1FBR 42 609 2075
Accumulated Amount of Fuel
Keprocessing, tons:
LWR 1394 8915 28924 68585
LMFBk 105 2886 15556
Volume of \';aste Generated
as Liquid 2)
Annually, 3/ 356 1274 3447 7299m year
3 1.39xl03 ·3 4 4Accumulated, m 9.92xl0 3.18xlO 7.41xlO
Volume of TtJaste Generated
as Solid3)
8.40xl03 4 5 3.72xl05Annually, liters/year 5.69xl0 1.76xlO
Accumulated, liters 1.93xl0
4 3.25x105 1.58xl06 4.26xl06
I)Reprocessing of fuel at 150 days after discharge from reactor
2)1.0 m3/ton fuel at 34,000 i1WD/T burnup
3)80 liters glass/ton fuel at 34,000 MWD/T five years after reprocessing
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The characteristics of the high-level wastes were calculated for a
number of the most interesting and important reactors, namely:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
PWR with an equilibrium uranium fuel cycle
PWR with plutonium recycle fuel
LMFBR with plutonium froman LW reactor industry
LMFBR with equilibrium fast reactor plutonium
HIGR (high temperature gas cooled reactor) with
an equilibrium 235U fuel cycle
THIR (high temperature gas cooled reactor) with
Z33U recycle fuel and 235U makeup.
In the LMFBR results it is assumed that the core and blanket are mixed
proportionally in the fuel reprocessing facility. In addition, it was
•
assumed that the PWR spent fuel wastes could be taken as representative
of all LW wastes. Since BWR's do not presently achieve a burnup reached
in PWR's, the assumption leads to an overestimate of the total LWR wastes
by approximately 10%. If BWR's obtain in the future a burnup equivalent
with PWR's then our assumption will be nullified.
For the calculations a set of fuel cycle programs /11/ were used to ob-
tain global descriptions and average parameters of the reactors. The to-
tal isotopic composition and decay heats of the spent fuels were calcu-
lated then by the ORIGEN program /12/. The calculated characteristics
of the high-level wastes per ton of spent fuel are given in Tables 5 to
10. The time periods in the tables are in reference to the time the fuel
was reprocessed, which in all cases was assumed to occur 150 days after
the fuel was discharged from the reactor. It was assumed that the pluto-
nium loss to the waste in all cases was 1.0% of the plutonium originally
present in the spent fuel elements. Present reprocessing losses for plu-
tonium are somewhat larger, ranging anywhere from 1.0% to 6.0%.
The data used in the reactor calculations are representative of present
and near-future generation reactors. The light water reactor data were
obtained from KWU /13/ and are representative of the type of reactors
KWU is presently offering on the light water reactor market. For the
LMFBR data the 2000 MWe reference design of Interatom and Projekt Schnel-
ler Brüter /14/ was used. Finally, for the high temperature gas cooled
reactors use was made of the Oak Ridge prepared "Evaluation of High-
Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors" /15/.
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Table 5: Characteristics of PWR(l) I) Spent Fuel Wastes (per me tric ton fuel)
Time . . . 2)S1nce reprocess1ng
(years) 1.0 3.0 5.0 10.0 30.0
Total activity, Mci I. 69 0.704 0.459 0.320 O. 186
Total heat-generation
rate, Kw 8.21 3. 16 1.77 1.06 0.58
Radioisotopes, ci
90Sr 7.64+4 7.27+4 6.92+4 h .12+4 3.74+4
137Cs 1.07+5 1.02+5 9.77+4 8.71+4 5.48+4
129 r 3.86-2 3.86-2 3.86-2 3.86-2 3.86-2
85Kr 1.05+4 9.24+3 8. 13+3 5.90+3 1.63+3
3H 6.72+2 6.02+2 5.38+2 4.06+2 1.32+2
238pu3) 1.06+2 1.24+2 I .23+2 1• 18+2 1.02+2
239 pu 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24
240pu 5. 13 5.66 6. 15 7.22 9.93
241 pu 1.01+3 9.22+2 8.39+2 6.61+2 2.56+2
241 Am 1.63+2 1.66+2 1.68+2 1.73+2 1.81+2
243Am 2.02+1 2.02+1 2.02+1 2.02+1 2.02+ I
242 Cm 4.07+3 I .90+2 1.60+1 7.67 6.99
244 Cm 2.68+3 2.49+3 2.30+3 1.90+3 8.84+2
I )PWR( 1)-pressurized light water reactor with equilibrium uranium fuel
cycle at 34 000 KwD/T burnup (initial enriehment 3.3%)
2)Reprocessing of fuel ISO days after discharge from reactor
3)1.0% plutonium lass to waste stream
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Iable 6: Characteristics of Pvffi(2) 1) Spent Fuel Wastes (per metric ton fuel)
Time . . 2)s~nce reprocess~ng
(year) Lu 3.0 5.0 10.0 30.0
Total activity, :-1ci L 75 0.722 0.468 0.325 0.187
Total heat-generation
rate, Kw 9.24 3.77 2.38 I. 55 0.83
Radioisotopes, ci
90Sr 6.83+4 6.50+4 6.19+4 5.47+4 3.34+4
137Cs 1.08+ 5 1.03+ 5 9.86+4 8.78+4 5.53+4
129 I 4. 14-2 4. 14-2 4.14-2 4.14-2 4. 14-2
85 Kr 9.50+3 8.35+3 7.35+3 5.33+3 1.48+3
3H 7.29+2 6.51+2 5.82+2 4.39+2 1.42+2
,)':I.Q ':1.\
.. JUpuJJ 2.31+2 2.76+2 2.75+2 2.65+2 2.29+2
239pu 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29
240 7.97 I. 22+ 1 1.61+1 2.46+1 4.61+1Pu
241 pu 1.40+3 1.27+3 1. 16+3 9.15+2 3.57+2
241, 2.76+2 2.79+2 2.82+2 2.88+2 2.98+2\m
243Am 8.88+1 8.88+1 8.88+1 8.88+1 8.88+ 1
242 1.03+4 4.77+2 3.74+1 1.64+1 1.49+ 1Cm
244 Cm 2. 13+4 1.97+4 1.83+4 1.51+4 7.01+3
I)PWR(2)-pressurized light water reactor with plutonium recycle fuel at
34 000 ~&~/T burnup. 19% of fissile charge is plutonium
2)Reprocessing of fuel 150 days after discharge from reactor
3)1.0% plutonium lass to waste stream
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Table 7 : Characteristics o f LMFBR ( I ) I) Spent Fuel Wastes (per metric fuel ton)
lime . . L)s~nce reprocess~ng
(years) 1.0 3.0 5.0 10.0 30.0
Total activity, Hci 2.29 0.832 0.471 0.287 O. 161
Total heat-generation
rate, Kw 10.35 3. 11 I. 50 0.84 0.51
Radioisotopes, ci
YO Sr 4.48+4 4.27+4 4.06+4 3.5~+4 2.19+4
137Cs 1.13+5 1.08+5 1.03+5 9. 15+4 5.77+4
129 1 3.59-2 3.59-2 3.59-2 3.59-2 3.59-2
85 Kr 7.48+3 6.58+3 5.79+3 4.20+3 I. 16+3
3H 8.93+2 7.98+2 7. 13+2 5.38+2 1.74+2
238pu3) 3.27+2 3.56+2 3.53+2 3.42+2 3.02+2
239pu 4.32+1 4.32+1 4.32+1 4.32+1 4.32+1
240pu 4.92+1 4.94+1 4.95+1 4.99+1 5.07+1
241 pu 5.74+3 5.22+3 4.75+3 3.75+3 1.45+3
241 A 2.50+3 2.51+3 2.52+3 2.53+3 2.54+3m
243Am 4.26+1 4.26+1 4.26+1 4.26+1 4.25+1
242 C 6.88+3 3.77+2 8.57+1 7.05+1 6.43+ 1m
244C 8.84+2 8.19+2 7.59+2 6.26+2 2.91+2m
I )U1FßR( 1): sodium cooled fast breeder reactor fueled vIi th plutonium from an
LVlR industry, core and blanket mixed proportionally for repro-
cessing, burnup·~ 34 000 MWD/T.
2)Reprocessing of fuel 150 days after discharge from reactor
'{"\ -
-'1.07. plutonium 10ss to waste stream
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Table 8: Characteris tics of LMFBR(2) 1) Spent Fuel Wastes (per metric ton fucl)
Time since . 2)reprocess1ng
(year) 1.0 3.0 5.0 10.0 30.0
Total activi ty, !·1ci 2.32 0.845 0.479 0.292 0.164
Total heat-generation
rate, Kw 10.48 3.16 1.56 0.95 0.59
Radioisotopes, Ci
90Sr 4.56+4 4.34+4 4.13+4 3.65+4 2.23+4
137Cs 1.14+5 1.09+5 1.04+5 9.30+4 5.86+4
129 1 3.64-2 3.64-2 3.64-2 3.64-2 3.64-2
85Kr 7.60+3 6.69+3 5.88+3 4.27+3 1. 18+ 3
3H 9.06+2 8.10+2 7.23+2 5.46+2 1. 77+2
238pu3) 4.01+1 4.86+1 4.86+1 4.75+ 1 4.32+1
239 4.65+1 4.65+1 4.65+1 4.65+ 1 4.65+1Pu
240pu 4.88+ I 4.88+1 4.88+1 4.88+1 4.89+1
241 pu 2.15+3 1.95+3 1.77+3 1.40+3 5.42+2
241 Am 7.55+2 7.59+2 7.63+2 7.69+2 7.74+2
_243Am 7.08 7.08 7.08 7.08 7.08
242Crn 1.90+3 1.03+2 2.30+1 1.88+ 1 1.71+ I
244 Cm 1.47+2 1.36+2 1.26+2 1.04+2 4.83+1
1)LMFER(2): sodium cooled fast breeder reactor fueled with fast breeder
equilibrium p1utonium;core and blanket mixed proportionally for re-
processing; burnup ~ 34 000 MWD/T
2) Reprocessing of fue1 150 days after discharge from reactor
3)1.0% plutonium 10ss to waste stream
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Table 9: Characteristics of HTGR 1) Spent Fuel Wastes (per metric ton fuel)
Time since
. 2)
reprocessing
(year) 1.0 3.0 5.0 10.0 30.0
Total activi ty, MCi 2.42 1.22 0.908 0.684 0.399
Total heat-generation
rate, Kw 11.2 5.20 3.47 2.26 I. 26
Radioisotopes, Ci
90Sr 1.93+5 1.84+5 1.75+5 1.55+5 9.93+4
137Cs 2.02+5 1.93+5 1.84+5 1.64+5 1.03+5
129 8.72-2 8.72-2 8.72-2 8.72-2 8.72-2I
85Kr 3.92+4 3.45+4 3.03+4 2.20+4 6.09+3
3H 8.29+2 7.41+2 6.62+2 4.99+2 1.62+2
232u3) 3.20 3. 14 3.08 2.94 2.42
238pu 1.06+2 1.07+2 1.05+2 1.01+2 8.67+1
239 pu o. 137 0.137 0.137 0.138 0.142
240pu 0.322 0.590 0.839 1.38 2.76
241 pu 9. 11+ 1 8.29+1 7.54+1 5.95+ 1 2.32+1
241 Am 2.34+1 2.36+1 2.38+ 1 2.42+1 2.46+1
243 5.62 5.62 5.62 5.62 5.62Am
242 4.59+2 2.13+ 1 1.64 0.702 0.640Cm
244Cm 1.36+3 1.26+3 I. 17+3 9.65+2 4.49+2
I)HTGR - high temperature reactor with no 233U recycle at 65 000 W~D/T
2)Reprocessing of fuel at 150 days after discharge from reactor
3). '''7' '.' • •. 1
'l.UIo pluton1um ano uran1um LOSS to waste stream
I)THTR - high temperature reactor with 233U recycle fuel at 65 000 ~~D/T
burnup
2)Reprocessing of fuel 150 days after discharge from reactor
3) I 0% - • d "•• plutonlum an uranlum 10SS to waste stream
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111. Evaluation of Societal Risk
In recent years there has been a wide spread growth of public awareness
and concern about the impact of large-scale technological activities on
man's environment. The awareness and concern on the part of the public
has been in part responsible for the attempt to quantify risks and bene-
fits involved in the operation of a particular technology. Risk can be
said to be an expression of the probability of a specific outcome oc-
curring due to a specific cause, e.g. the probability of suffering a
fatal accident while driving a car.
The analysis of risk can be decomposed into two broad and separate
aress. To discuss the ideas involved it i8 instructive to follow the
illustrative flow chart for risk analysis shown in Fig. 6.
The firstarea of the analysis of risk i8 what i8 called the "elements
of risk analysis". This area lends itself to mathematical treatment.
In this area the methods for calculating the risk of an activity are
studied. For example, an attempt is made to calculate the probability
of an undesired event occurring, the magnitude of the subsequent re-
lease of hazardous materials, the degree of interaction of the released
material with the population, and finally the effect of the material
on the well-being of the population. Briefly, the analytical approach
to the analysis involves the following steps:
Identification of "Events" of interest (Le., events associated
vith the release of radioactive material).
Development of Boolean express ions which describe the circum-
stances (subsystem or element failures) under which these
events can occur - perhaps supplanted by stylized pictorial
representations (e.g. fault trees).
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Development of models which evaluate the consequences of these
events (e.g. mortality risks) in terms of the magnitude of re-
lease and exogenous factors (e.g. weather patterns, population
densities, etc.).
Evaluation of the likelihood of these consequences by exercising
the models vith data.
This type of analysis has been extensively employed by Otway /17/
and Otway et ale /19/ to analyze the safety of reactor systems.
The outputs of the analysis, as outlined above, are then used to deter-
mine the acceptability of the system. The activities entailed are the
last two show in Fig. 6, the illustrative flow chart. This is an area
which may be termed "components of risks", the second area in risk anal-
ysis. Here one attempts to find the parameters important in risk ac-
ceptance, aud the relationship between risk acceptance snd benefits
derived. For example, a few such important parameters between risk ac-
ceptance and benefits are: magnitude and frequency of accidents, vol-
untary verses involuntary. In other words, one attempts to place the
calculated risk from the system in some perspective.
The two areas of risk analysis are discussed below in somewhat greater
detail. Emphasis is given to the approach of risk evaluation of radio-
active waste management procedures.
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A. Components of Risks
A number of attempts have been made, most notably by Starr 116/, to
find relationships between public risk acceptance and benefits de-
rived. Starrfound that the acceptance (measured by participation)
of various technologies increased aB the associated risk decreased.
He postulated that the value of the statistical risk of death from
disease to be the "psychological yard stick" by which people sub-
jectively establish the acceptability of other risks. Otway 117/,
in a study ofthe probability of accidental death from various
causes, concluded that people intuitively seem to be unaware of
risks at a mortality risk level of 10-6 per person per year. He
therefore postulated as an acceptable maximum risk of 10-7 per
person per year for a person living nearest to nuclear power reactors.
In a nutshell, what one does is to search for the parameters impor-
tant in public risk acceptance and their associated levels of risk
and then attempt to design the facilities of the technology so that
their imposed risk falls below the specified limits. The assumption
involved is that the society will accept the "new" technelogy. In
ether words, they will apply their preestablished "yardstick" in
judging the risks of ehe technology. However, if the technology is
new and the safety has not been sufficiently weIl demonstrated, andl
or the credibility of the risk estimates are questioned, the society
may readjust its yardstick considerably when judging the acceptance
of the technology. This has certainly been the case with nuclear power.
A eonvenient yardstick to use in ü~king comparisons, or seeking points
of references, of nuclear power systems and associated facilities are
the naturally existing background radiation fields or radiation doses
one receives from medical diagnosis and treatment. For radioactive
waste disposal schemes one could compare the potential hazards of
the wastes to that of naturally existing radioactive ores, as uranium
and thorium ore deposits. Since most waste disposal schemes call for
burial of the waste the analogy is clese. The establishment that the
wastes, due to the disposal scheme, present a hazard of the same order
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of magnitude, or smaller, than common uranium ore is no assurance,
however, that society will accept the risk. The two possibilities
existing are to gain public acceptance by exhaustively demonstrating
safety or by modifying the disposal system so as to be acceptable.
An important question in this context is that of social rate of
discount. The production of energy by fission produces wastes that
will remain potentially dangerous for many hundreds of years. We
will, therefore, pass our wastes from energy produced today to
generations of the future. The value we intuitively place on the
life of someone in a future generation reflects our social rate of
discount. For example, the value of life to our children's children,
yet to be born, is quite high, but in the more distance future the
value declines rapidly. We will have to address the question of
social rate of discount when considering the potential hazards of
waste.
B. Elements of Risk Analysis
As explained above the elements of risk analysis concerns itself
with the specific calculation, through various means, of the risk
to a person in the population of meeting a given fate. The approach
~s to calculate from mathematical principles, or statistical data
when it is available, the probability of a specific event occurring.
This approach can be classified broadly under the heading of "design
under risk". In this sense risk is understood to mean chance, as ~n
gambling. In other words, it is a condition under which it is possible
to calculate in one manner or another, the probability of all possible
eventsoccurring. It is, however, also possible that there may be
instances when one does not have, or is not able to calculate, the
probabilities of events occurring. In this case we would classify
the situation under the heading of "design under uncertainty". A
more detailed distinction between these two classes is made by
Weisman /IS/.These two approaches to the evaluation of risk are
considered separately below.
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Bl. Design under Risk
This approach has been, most recently, developed for nuclear reactors
quite extensive1y by Otway in a number of papers (see for examp1e /19/).
In essence,the approach is to define the risk from a reactor as the
sum of all bio10gica1 risks from all conceivable accidents weighted
by the respective accident probabi1ities. The accident probabi1ities
must be ca1culated as 1itt1e or no statistical data is available.
The princip1e means of doing so is through fault tree analysis /20/
which is a means of assessing the likelihood of a complex system
performance. The development of a fault tree begins with adefinition
of the end system fault condition, the undesired event. The system
is then methodica1ly analyzed to determine all the logical combinations
of functional fault events that can cause the end event. The analysis
is wholly dependent on a thorough knowledge of the system functions
and configurations. The assumptions invo1ved are:
1. The components of the fault tree are independent
2. The minimal cut sets of the system are known.
(In everyday language a minimal cut set is the smallest
set of primary faults such that if all these primary
faults simultaneously exist, than the end system fault
condition exists.)
These assumptions are not necessarily always valid. There is no way
to guarantee that the tree, when constructed, does not neglect some
important mode of failure. For example, the Windscale, SL-1, and NRX
accidents all occurred in totally unexpected ways. Furthermore, any
tree must necessarily be a minimum fault tree because of these
overlooked paths;it therefore can not be conservative unless it is
perfect.
Despite the shortcomings of the methods briefly explained above they
have been and will be used in the analysis of complex systems, such
as nuclear power plants, fuel reprocessing plants,etc. However,the
application of the method to the analysis of waste storage facilities
is hindered in same respects. The safety of long-term storage, or
disposal, faciiities has to be guaranteed for hundreds of years. Dur
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ability to assign probabilities to events that may oeeur in the
distant future is questionable. For example, to list a few of
the events that are important for our eonsideration one would
have
1. ehanges in loeation of seismie aetivities
2. ehanges in loeation of voleanie aetivities
3. sabotage and war
4. ehanges in eivilization levels
Of eourse it may be argued that a eatastrophie event that eould
endanger the waste storage faeilities would have more severe eon-
sequenees than the subsequent release of radioaetive materials.
In this ease the seeondary eonsequenees of the event, release of
radioaetive wastes, are of only passing interest.
B2. Design under Uneertainty
As mentioned above, when we know what eonditions or events are
possible but eannot estimate the probabilities with whieh they
oeeur, we are in a eondition of uncertainty. It i8 therefore,
diffieult to ealeulate a risk, let alone seleet an optimum waste
management seheme. At the present time, decision theory provides
no one best eriterion for seleetinga strategy under eonditions
of uneertainty. Instead, there are a number of different eriteria.
Four of these eriteria are diseussed below. For this purpose we
shall use an example to illustrate the applieation of the eriteria.
We shall label the waste management sehemes, or strategies, as Si
and the possible events as N~. In this sense an event would have
- J
assoeiated with it arelease of radioaetive material and subse-
quentlya 10ss, or burden (X~~) for mankind. Therefore, the matrix
~I
~OL our deeis10n problem would look like the following.
- 37 -
~ N N N3 NI 2 mXn X12 Xl3 Xlm
52 X21 X22 X23 X2m
5
n
X
nm
X. I • I for some j!,
1 J
therefore eliminated.
The problem at hand is to seleet from the n possible strategies,
the one most desirable or optimum, through applieation of some
form of eriterion. It may be possible, before proeeeding, to
eliminate one or more strategies from eonsideration by use of the
dominanee prineiple. That is, any strategy 5. would be elimi-
1
nated from eonsideration if its losses X.. were greater than the
1J
eorresponding losses for any other strategy. Mathematiea11y,
if X.. > x. ,. for all j, and further X.. ,.
1J - 1 J 1J
strategy S. is dominated by strategy S. land
1 1
Generally, however, the dominanee prineiple is not itself ade-
quate for making a unique seleetion from the possible strategies.
A unique seleetion ean be made by applieation of the eriterion of
pessimism, of optimism, of regret or the subj eetivist eriterion /21/.
-Criterion of pessimism
Under this eriterion the deeisionrnaker aets in a eomplete1y
pessimistie manner. It is assumed that Nature would always be
rnalevolent; that is, Nature always aets to maximize our lasses.
Therefore under this eriterion one would seleet the strategy
whieh minimizes the maximum possible 10ss. This eriterion is
sometimes ealled the "minimax" eriterion.
To illustrate simply the applieation of this eriterion assume
that our matrix for the waste management strategies is (3x3)
with the following fietitious values.
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Nl N2 N3
Sl 5 1 9
S2 6 3 6
53 4 2 7
Decision Matrix
Dur fictitious losses could be in units of man-remis x 10-6
(product of the number of people exposed to radiation and the
exposure they receive). In this case the worst that could. be
experienced for each strategy would be
Strategy Maximum Loss
SI 9
S2 6
S3 7
and we would therefore select strategy S2 since it minimizes
the maximum possible loss.
The argument based on pessimism can be described as a conservative
approach to an intrinsically difficult problem. A more refined
application of this criterion, as illustrated in the following
case, stems from its application to the theory of games /22/.
-Criterion of Optimism
Why should we always assume that Nature will be malevolent? After
all, there are times when we get good breaks. Being a complete
optimist we would then select strategy SI under the assumption that
event N2 would be the determining influence in the future. How-
ever,it was not suggested that a rational decisionrr~ker should be
completely optimistic. Rather, a "coefficient of optimism" can
be introduced, which takes intc acccunt the minimum and wAxim~~
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possible losses, by weighting their importance to the decision
in accordance with the decisionmakers feeling of optimism. The
coefficient of optimism is defined in terms of a standard lot-
tery i22/ between the maximum and miniITlum losses. In this CRse
it is assumed that the decisionmaker has decided to participate
in the lottery since adecision not to entails not managing the
waste andtherefore, more severe consequences, or losses,
for mankind. Therefore,the decisionmaker assigns to the min-
imum loss a probability which hewould be willing to accept in a
lottery between the maximum and minimum losses. This probability
is then the decisionmakers coefficient of optimism. Assume, for
example, that our coefficient of optimism is 0.7. That means that
we would be willing to accept the minimum lass if it has a prob-
ability of occurance of 0.7 and a maximum loss probability of
0.3. The application of theprinciple is as follows, assuming
that either the maximum or the minimum will occur and with the
indicated probabilities.
Strategy Max. loss Min. loss Expected 10ss
S n , 9*0.3 + 1*0.7 = 3.41 ':J J.
S2 6 3 6*0.3 + 3*0.7 = 3.9
S3 7 2 7*0.3 + 2*0.7 = 3.6
According to this criterion strategy Si would be selected since
it has the lowest expected loss.
-Criterion of Regret
As suggested by Savage i23/ it is worthwhile to transform our
decision matrix before adecision is taken. Savage argues that
after a decisionmaker knows the outcome, or event that has
occured, he may experience regret because he may wish he had
seiected a different strategy. Savage therefore suggests that
the decisionmaker should attempt to minimize this regret which
he can experience.
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To illustrate the point, assume that strategy 52 had been selected
and that event Nt has occurred. The regret experienced would be the
difference between 6, the 10ss experienced, and the lower loss of
4, had strategy 53 been selected, which in this case would have been
better. However, if instead of NI event N) had oceurred, then the
deeisionmaker wou1d experience no regret sinee his deeision resulted
in the lowest possible 10ss. Following this logie we can construct
the following regret matrix.
NI N2 N3 Maximum Regret
51 0 3 3
52 2 2 0 2
53 0
Regret Matrix
Therefore, to minimize our regret we would seleet strategy 53.
The Subjectivist Criterion
The foregoing illustrative example indieates that deeisions under
uneertainty depend on which eriterion one uses. We would, therefore,
like some rational basis for our choice of the criterion. However,
it is generally feIt that non~ of the decision criteria under un-
eertainty satisfies a set of applieable axioms. Eaeh i5 defeetive
in some respects.
Furthermore, these decision criteria do not use all the information
available to the decisionmaker. For example, IIminimaxll eonsiders
only the worst x.. for eaeh N.; all the other outcomes are ignored.
1J J
Rationality demands that the decisionmaker, in making his decision,
should consider the effects of all the information available to
him. This ean be aceomplished by the extension of the subjectivist
criterion explained below.
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The subjeetivist would maintain that the deeisionmaker has useful
information in the form of degrees of belief eoneerning the like-
lihoods of oceurrenee of the relevant states of nature. The sub-
jeetivist would eonsider our problem as any other deeision prob-
lem under risk.
The eriterion reeommended by the subjeetivists is ealled the Laplaee
eriterion. Under this eriterion if the probabilities with whieh the
various events will oeeur are not known, we assume that they are all
equal. We then ealeulate the expeeted loss for eaeh strategy and se-
leet that strategy whieh has the 10west expeeted 10ss. In our ease
we have three possible states of nature and we would therefore as-
sume that each would oeeur with a probability of 1/3.
Strategy Expeeted loss
SI 1/3x(5+!+9) = 5.0
52 1/3x(6+3+6) = 5.0
53 1/3x(4+2+7) = 4.33
Therefore, aeeording to the Laplaee criterion we would seleet strategy 53.
Normally, however, the deeisionmaker has some feeling about the like-
lihood of oeeurrenee of the various events. He eould as weIl use his,
or a combination of other's judgmental probabilities to resolve his
deeision problem. The obtaining and use of judgmental probabilities
15 quite clearly explained and advocated by Raiffa /24/. In this re-
speet we can use the teehnique of "sensitivity probing" to determine
how unbalanced the probabilities would have to be to obtain a shift
in the selection of astrategy. It may be that the seleetion of a
strategy is not very sensitive to the probabilities, the unbalanee
of which are within aeceptable range based on judgment of the deei-
sionmaker, or a consensus of experts.
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c. Specific Problems Related to Risk Evaluation of Radioactive Waste
Management
There are problems inherent in the risk evaluation of radioactive
waste management schemes that complicate the evaluation consider-
ably. Present available methods for risk evaluation are not readily
applicable here due to many reasons. The first is the addition of
the time dimension to the problem, and the closely related problem
of one being almest totally incapable of calculating event probab-
ilities in the time dimension of periods longer than that of re-
corded history. These problems are discussed in the following.
The nuclear fuel cycle has associated with it two types, or elements,
of risk. The first is the risk due to the operation of the facilities
that compose the fuel cycle. In this argument the final waste dispos-
al facility 1S not considered in operation after final closure. This
risk to health, or death, i8 a result of possible accident con~itions
of the facility during operation and of the normal operational re-
leases of radioactive materials. The second element of risk is due
to the generation of the radioactive wastes. The radioactive wastes
released to the environment immediately, or after a delay time, in
the liquid and gaseous effluents of the facilities are considered a
part of the first type of risk. The major portion of the waste, in
terms of radioactivity, is however contained and handled in a manner
respecting its potential biological hazard. The main distinction bet-
ween these two risk elements is that the first does not have a time
factor in it. In other words, the first risk element can be effect-
ively "shut-off" by simply discountinuing operation of the nuclear
fuel cycle facilities. The second element is, more or less, a per-
manent risk which will be inherited by future generations, i.e., if
we have no means of removing all the wastes permanently from our
environment. We do not presently possess a means of eliminating
the risk due to the radioactive waste even though such means are
under intensive investigation. These two elements of risk, as we
call them, are illustrated graphically in Fig. 7. In this figure
~
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no attempt has been made to maintain a realistie seale on the coordi-
nates or a reasonable ratio between the two curves. 1t must be men-
tioned that there is a slight overlap of the elements of risk. For
instance, some long half-life isotopes, e.g. 1291 , are released in
the gaseous effluents of the facilities and are reconcentrated by or-
ganisms. Once this isotope is released it represents an irreversible
commitment to the environment and a source of long-term risk.
Notice in the figure that after discontinued operation of the nuclear
fuel cycle the risk dUe to the radioactive wastes decrease slowly with
time. This would be expeeted due to the natural decay of the waste iso-
topes to stable isotopes. The time period for the curve to reach an ef-
fective "zero point" is, however, very long, literally millions of years.
1t is, however, possible that rather than decrease, the curve could rise
for several possible reasons. One obvious reason is a decline in the
technological capabilities of our civilization. Any reader of the book
"The Limits to Growth" can appreciate this; civilization in the future
may not have the material means of handling possible "breakdowns" in
our waste disposal facilities. A second possible reason for an increase
i8 an unintentional "opening" of a waste disposal facility. A third
possibility would be a catastrophic breakdown in the waste facilities
due to presently unforeseen circumstances which could not be handled
even with an advanced technology.
Another important point in this respect is adefinition of an effec-
tive "zero point" for the second element of risk. There is obviously
a risk associated with the wastes until the time the last atom has
decayed even though the risk due to one atom would be considered neg-
ligible. The time the last atom would decay is infinity. Therefore,
it is desirable to define a point in time after which we would con-
sider the wastes to be no longer "dangerous". A convenient means of
defining the "zero point" would be by compari80n of the waste dis-
posal facility to naturally occurring risks of the same type. For
example, the zero point would be the time when inadvertent opening
of the waste facility is no more hazardous than that due to exposing
uranium or thorium ore. A time period so defined may, indeed, be very
long.
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A second approach, and also a supplement to the above concept, is
that of a "social rate of discount". The concept involved is that
we may intuitively equate the value of death, or well-being, of a
person today with that of (J.O + i)n persons sometime in the fu-
ture. If n is an integer and expresses the number of years hence,
than i would be the social rate of discount. To put it another way,
the risk of one life today to secure the safety of one life in the
near future has no meaning. However. to secure the safety of JOD
lives in the near future does have meaning to uso
If one is able to obtain a rate of discount in this respect then it
would be possible to find the upper limit of additional risk one is
willing toaccept today from the waste management sehemes to secure
an additional degree of safety, say in 300 years from now. This
would be possible even with only an order of magnitude estimate of
the number of people that would be endangered by arelease of ma-
terial from the disposal facility in 300 years. Two possible dis-
posal extremes would be total radioactive waste disposal by deep
space disposal or by hydraulic-fracturing slightly below the
earth's surface. The first scheme is probably the most expensive
incost and safety for the present generation, but can guarantee
the highest degree of safety for future generations. The second
scheme is very inexpensive in cost and safety for us today, but
probably the most expensive in safety in the long run. Someplace
between the two alternatives lays an optimum which can be evaluated
with the concept of social rate of discount. It may turn out that
the natural decay of the radioactive waste would more than counter-
balance the effect of time-dependent concept of risk with the so-
cial rate of discount concept, depending of course on the magni-
tude of the rate of discount.
Very few attempts at obtaining a soeial rate of discount have been
made. One such attempt was made by Feldstein /25/ to measure so-
ciety's marginal rate of substitution between eonsumption in con-
secutive years. However, what we seek is a measure of what we are
willing to sacrifice today for the exclusive benefit of others
that will live after uso A possible measure of this is life
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insurance. Life insurance is something we purchase (sacrifice
a portion of our disposable income) to guarantee the level of
well-being of people whose present well-being is the purchaser's
responsibility. However, with present available data on life in-
surance (see for example the Life Insurance Fact Book /26/) it
may not be possible to evaluate the desired social rate of dis-
count.
The preceding remarks illustrate the difficulty of applying so-
called "standard" risk analysis methods to the evaluation of risk
from waste management schemes, or even for the purpose of select-
ing an optimum waste management strategy. For exampIe, in the de-
cision matrix of the preceding section the elements of the matrix
are not mutually excIusive since the period of time over which
events can occur, and be of interest for the decision process,
is very longe In addition, many of the elements of the matrix
will not in any way represent a "loss" to the decisionmaker him-
self. Nevertheless, it is feIt that these points can be resolved
by the application of a technique being developed in Operations
Research. The application of this technique, called utility theory,
is illustrated by USe in two widely different areas, the first by
Turban and Metersky /27/. and the other by Keeney /28/. Inherent
in the application of utility theory is the use of judgmental
probabilities and involves a procedure somewhat similar to that
explained under the subsection "The Subjectivist Criteriori" in
section 111. B2.
- 47 -
IV. Hazard Index of Radioaetive Wastes
Before one ean eonsider any disposal system for any type of hazardous
material it is absolutely neeessary to know the eharaeteristics of the
material. In addition, the time behaviour of the properties of the material
and the relative eeo logieal importanee of the various eomponents of the
material (if there are more than one) must be knmm. Therefore. before we
diseuss waste disposal sehemes for radioaetive wastes we examine the
eharaeteristies of these wastes.
Typieally. radioaetive wastes are characterized by curies (disintegra-
tions/see.) per unit volume of the waste as a function of the time from
the date that the reactor fuel was reprocessed. This type of characterization
is not ideal since the biological effect of the waste is only partially
determined from the curies. More important is the type of decay particle and
its energy. which are inherent properties of the decaying isotope. In
addition. it is important to know the relative easewith whieh the isotopes
move through our environment, the extent to which they are reconcentrated
by organisms directly. or indirectly, involyed in manls food chain, and
our own critical organ's characteristic rate of accumulation and elimination.
Therefore.to properly design a waste disposal system it is necessary to have
an index for each radioactive isotope which reflects all of these properties.
The establishment of such a true index is a very difficult problem and can
only be partially accomplished today due to the lack of sufficient data.
As a first approximation to a hazard index we have used the reciprocal of
the established maximum permissible concentration of the isotope in water.
MPC (Ci/m3). In other words. the hazard index (Hl i ) of Qi curies of
'v
isotope i in a radioactive waste mixture is defined as
= (1 )
The units of the hazard index are volume (m3) of water required to dilute the
radioaetive isotope to aeceptable limits. The total hazard index of the
waste is found by summing over all isotopes present;
HI = I Hl i = 1:
i i (2)
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It has to be emphasized that even though we use this hazard index
throughout this work, there are some severe shortcomings involved Ln
the defini don.
The basic procedure Ln setting the maximum permissible concentrations for
the general public is to calculate that amount of each radioisotope in
water or air which after 50 years cf continuous intake or inhalation would
result in a dose to the critical body organ equal to the maximum permissible
dose. In order to ensure uniformity it has become customary to compute the
NPC ' s for a "standard man" (see Ref. /29/). The actual dose which an individual
will receive from the maximum permissible body burden will thus depend on
whether he is larger or srnaller than the standard man and whether his
relevant physiological processes are on the high or low side of normal.
The criteria for chronic exposure of the public should, however, be related
to maximum permissible doses rather than to MPC's since the latter do not
explici tly consider perhaps more limi ting pathways /30/ of expos ure than
those caused by inhalation of air or ingestion of \l7ater. Special considerations
should also be given to the specifie Ioeation of the faeilities treating the
wastes as there may be mechanisms available for the reconcentration of the
radioac.tive isotopes and pathways for ingestion by the ptiblic. Such pathways
are illustrated in the two diagrams of Fig. 8 and 9.
Finally, the hazard of a radioactive noble gas LS represented better by the
MPC for inhalation than the MPC for ingestion. In addition, the other isotopes
can be considered to have a residence time in the atmosphere as well as on
the ground. That is, it is entirely possible that the isotopes ean be released
to the atmosphere, as a result of an accident or normal suspension mechanisms,
deposited on the ground on1y to be later resuspended. Therefore,the contribution
to the hazard from these two exposure mechanisms could be obtained as a
weighted sumo Since we eannot in any case, add meaningfully volumes of air
and water we convert the }WC's to maximum permissible annual intake, MPI
(Ci/yr). The MPI's are obtained by multiplying the respeetive MPC by the
volume of water ingested (0.8 m3) or the volume of air inhaled (7300 m3)
annually by the "standard man". Our hazard index would be in this ease for
isotope i
Hl i Ql.
r ~1.
= l -"'-_+MPl i
W
(3}
where t~IL = maximum permissible annual inhalation cf
a
isotope i (Ci/yr.)
and a1., bi are appropriate weighting factors for isotope L.
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An attempt to define a hazard index has also been made by Gera and
Jacobs /31/. Tney choose to define a potential hazard index (PHI) for
an isotope i as
(4 )
Qi total activity of isotope i (Ci)
:,fPIl. maximum permissible annual ingestion of isotope 1. (Ci), and
T1 = physical half~life of isotope i (years).
P. is a factor dependent on the biological availability of radioisotope il.
once i t is dispersed into the environment and on the reliabili ty of \oJas te
containment, and represents the probability of the nuclide leaving the site
of disposal or handling, and reaching man. Because of the limited data
available they set P. equal to one. The indusion of the mean life (T 1 /0.693)
1
in the definition of the hazard index PHI represents a measure of the time
span during which the radioisotope will exist. Gera and Jacobs consider
also a weighting of the hazard index for inhalation and ingestion of the
form shown in Eq. (3).
Comparing the hazard index used in this work, Eq. (I), and that l.n Eq. (4)
one can make the following important remark, realizing that
=
Tf P. is set equal to one then the difference between Eq. (1) and Eq. (4)l.
1S that Eq. (1) represents an instantaneous hazard, or risk, at the time
one has Qi curies of isotope i. On the other hand.Eq. (4) represents a time
integrated hazard, or risk, from the point in time one has Ql. curies of
isotope i to infini ty. For example, by integrating the exponential equation
for radioactive decay,
where Ql. l.S the curies present at t = 0 , one finds
o
oe
f
o
...
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... -A.t
Q1. J e 1. dt
o
o
... ...
Ti
0.693
Therefore, if one calculates the values of Eq. (4) as a function of
the age of the waste one has, in effect, at each time point the hazard
integrated forward in time. The use of Eq. (4) implies. therefore, an
assumption involving the social rate of discount of risk; that iso there
is no rate of discount used. This does not represent, however, human
intuitive thinking as discussed in section 111. It is for this reason
that we choose to use the hazard index defined by Eq. (I).
The inclusion of a social rate of discount in the Eq. (4) is quite
easily performed by assuming an exponential function for the value of
future risks as perceived today with a discount rate of a!year; i.e.
e-
at
• Introducing this into the integration of exponential decay equa-
t ion one finds
..
J Qi(t)e-at dt
o
...
....i
~o i0.693 + aT
and therefore Eq. (4) becomes, with Pi ... 1.0,
... x i0.693 + aT
(5)
Setting a = 0 one obtains Eq. (4).
As mentioned above Eq. (I) does, however. suffer from some limitations.
These limitations could be relaxed by the inclusion of a factor Pi' as
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defined in Eq. (4), and the appropriate weighting factors defined in
Eq. (3), if sufficient data were available. The calculation of these
factors would depend on such parameters as the form of the waste com-
position, the location of the waste treatment and storage facility,
etc. For the general discussion that follows in the next section it is
sufficient, to a first approximation, to use Eq. (1) for the hazard
index. From this hazard index it is possible to get a relative idea
of the importance of the various radioactive isotopes present in the
wastes and the possible gains, or losses, to be achieved through dif-
ferent waste handling procedures.
The hazard index of Eq. (1) has been calculated for the spent fuel com-
6position of seven different cases for a time span of 1 to 10 years after
reprocessing of the fuel. In all cases it was assumed that reprocessing
of the fuel occurs 150 days after discharge from the reactor. The plu-
tonium and uranium losses to the waste stream were assumed to be 1.0%
of the quantity present in the spent fuel. In addition, the same loss
was assumed for thorium from the high temperature reactor fuel. These
losses are representative of today's technology. All other heavy metals
present in the fuel are assumed to follow the waste stream. The cases
calculated are the following:
1) PWR 1131 with an equilibrium uranium fuel cycle,
3.3% initial enrichment
34 000 MWD/T burnup
2) PWR withplutonium recycle fuel (1 st recycle)
:19% of fissile charge plutonium
34 000 MWD/T burnup
...A
3) same as 2) except 2"- recycle of plutonium
4) LMFBR 141 fueled with plutonium from an LWR reactor
industry, core and blanket are mixed proportionally
in reprocessing,34 000 MWD/T burnup of mixture
5) same as 4) except LMFBR fueled with fast breeder
equilibrium plutonium
6) THTR 1151 high temperature reactor reference design
233U recycle fuel
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7) HTGR same as 6) except no 233U recycling
equilibrium uranium fuel of 93% enrichment.
The burnup calculations were performed as explained in the previous sec-
tion II.e3. In the calculation 461 fission product isotopes were consid-
ered, as weIl as all heavy metals from 207Tl to 253Es • Activation pro-
ducts of the fuel element cladding, element spacers, etc. were also cal-
culated.
The results of these calculations per ton fuel (1000 kg) are given in
Figs. 10 to 22. No los ses are assumed for any of the fission products,
as for example, 85Kr and 3H which do not follow the waste stream. The
curves are, therefore, not meant to represent a particular waste compo-
sition but rather to illustrate the relative importance of the indivi-
dual isotopes present. In the heavy metal curves, for example Fig. 11,
the individual elements labeled refer to the element and its daughter
products.
At this point one can make some interesting discoveries from these
curves.
From the fission product curves one notices that the isotopes fit into
two distinct classes, those that essentially vanish within 1000 years
and those that are practically constant over the 106 year time span.
Th . h d . th 1 are 90Sr and 1291 • Thee two 1sotopes t at eterm1ne e enve ope
fission products determine the total waste hazards up to about 600 years,
after which time the heavy metals dominate. The difference in the hazards
of the fission products and heavy metals from 600 years to 106 years is
only to 2 orders of magnitude.
As points of reference the hazard index for fresh fuel compositions, i.e.
for the fuel before it is placed in the reactor, have also been calcu-
lated. These are the following per ton fuel:
HI (PWR case I) ... 6.49x104
BI (PWR case 2) ... t.66x109
nT (LMFBR case 4) ... ' '6x,oI0nJ.. 1 e I .I.
HI (LMFBR 5) 9case ... 2.49xlO
EI {Tl-l'I'~ f:,.'\ 6, .. &.&. .... a. ... case ~, ... 9.61x!O
I.
HI (HTGR case 7) .. 5.52xlO~
=,-.-
x
G)
'1:l
C
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v. I':aste Disposal Schei~es and Associateei lHsks
Ln this sectio;l of the paper we shall discuss many of thc proposed ~"aste
disposal concepts. The concepts have been organized into three categories,
namely (1) ul timate disposal, (2) long-term disposal, ami (3) storage. The
problcr.1s associated \.,ith each scheIne and the associated risks are outlined.
A. Ijl tinlatc Disposal
As explained earlier ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes refers to
disposal scl1ernes such that after disposal has been successfully accomplished
it is impossible for the wastes to return to manls biosphere. The two
schemes that fulfill this criterion are disposal ;)y,
1) Nucleat Transrnutation
and 2) Deep Srace Disposal.
These t\vO schemes are discussed separately below.
AI. ~uclear Transmutation
The prospect of "hurning" our radioacti ve \.,as tes has indeed a very .'lttractive
a?peal to it. However,the feasibility and the justification of transmuting
the wastes is still under heated discussion. The concept involved is that
oue produces a stable isotope, or one that is less hazardous. throu~ a
lluclear reaction. In considering the feasibili ty of the concept several
criteria roust be satisfied. these being:
I) The transrnutation rate must be significantly fas ter than the
natural decay rate and comparab le in magni tude to the production
rate of the isotope in the nuclear power reactor.
2) An overall energy balance roust be fulfilled. In other words.
the power derived when producing the original isotope roust be
greater than that required to transrnute the isotope.
The proposals to date for transrouting the wasteS involve the use of intense
accelerator sources, fission reactors (thermal and fast) and fusion reactors.
The use of intense accelerator sourees, as proposed hy Gregory and Stein-
berg /32/, appears to fall short of being able to achieve a positive energy
balance as shown by Davidenko /33/. It is interesting to note that
\veinberg /34/ considers the possibility of having high-powered neutron
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generating accelerators in the next 25 to 50 years. TIle contrnl1ed thermo-
nuclear reactor could scrve as an inexpensive intense neutron source, as
prosposed by v'okenhauer /35;, i fand \.;rhen such a reactor exis ts. The
prospect of usinb the (n, 2n) reaction, which is possible with the 14 j'·1eV
neutrons from the fusion reactor, is very attractive. With this reaction one
would transmute an isotope and at the Same time produce two addi tional
neutron for further transmutation reactions. However, both the accelerator
and fusion reactor neutron sources can, at present, only be considered as
possibilities in the distant future.
The prospect of using the fission reactor itself for transmuting its OWn
\.;rastes is areal possibility. It is not possible, uuder curreut reactor
conditions, for the reactor to destory its OWn unseparated radiqactive
wastes since neither of the two criteria above can be satisfied. Steinberg
et .al. /36/ considered the possibility of transmuting selected fission
product isotopes from the radioactive waste stream, namely 85Kr , 90 Sr and
137c t' • h' .. h 1 f . fs. IlOHeVer, S1nce t e 1sotopes eX1st 1n t e waste on y as ract10ns 0
the total element, wher~ the weight rates of the isotopes to the element are:
L'WBR LWR HTGR
85 Kr /Kr = -7% ~8% ~8%
90 Sr / Sr = ~60% ~617. ~551;
137 Cs / Cs = ~357.. ~45% ~4 7%
it is necessary to isotopically enrich the transrnutation target to achieve
a minirr.uITi transmutation cost. The process would involve a recycling of the
waste from the transmutation target in the fission reactor to an isotope
enrichment plant when a speeific fracHon of the target has been transmuted.
As a result of the low capture cross sections of these fission products and
the flux level of 10 13 to 10 15 n/sec-cm2 of present reactor designs one is
not able to achieve a transmutation rate significantly greater than the
natural decay rate. This applies also toather important fission product
isotopes. Therefore, the fission reactor of present day design, does not
appear to have the possibility for transmuting fission product isotopes.
:lowever, the possibility of a transmutation process with fission reactors for
the actinides appears to be much different for the following reasons:
41) the half-Hfes of the actinides are of the order of 10 years and 2) their
cross sections are at less an order of magnitude larger than those of cesium or
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strontium. Since the transmutation process for the actinides is a fission
reaction the assun:ption involved is that the resulting fission products are
less hazardou" than the actinides. In this respect the actinic.les, for
exaI:1p le curi ur.; or americum, in the reactor do not di ffer from the uran~um
or the plutonium isotopes of the reactor fuel. That is, the actinides serve
as a source of energy in the transwutation process anrl therefore do not
differ funrlamentally from an equivalent amount of plutonium fissions to
produce tile same energy.
Claibor~e /37/ studied the effects of recycling the actinides through a PWR
reactor. He found that the effect of the recycling did not have a significant
iir.pact on the neutron econorey of cOifullercial reactors. The reduction in the
long-term hazards l ) Qf the waste was reduced by a factor of 40 to 200 for
the case one could separate 99.5% or 99.9% of the actinides from the waste,
respectively. The teclmology to separate the actiriides (Np, Am, Cm) from
the waste does not, however, presently exist. Calculations similar to Claibornes
were performed for the recycling of the actinides through fast breeder
reactors. The americum and curium isotopes produced in the reactor were added
to the next fuel charge of the reactor. One sees from the results of these
calculations, Fig.23, that an eql.lilibrium is reached after many recycles,
that is, the inventory of these isotopes becomes constant with time.
The important point here is that the value of "burning" the actinides is
directly related to the degree that the isotopes can be separated from
the wastes. For example, in Figs.I I ,15, and 16 it is seen that one gains
lütle in a hazard reduction by remov~ng a11 of the americum, curium and
neptinium isotopes from the waste as long as the 1.0% plutonium loss remains.
Therefore, the entire value of the scheme will depend on the ability to
develop a technology capable of separating to a high degree (99.9999%) all
the heavy metals from the fission products. From Figs .13 and 17 we see that
a clean separation of actinides from the fission products will only gain us
something of the order of one, or maximum two, orders of magnitude reduction
in the long-term hazard due to the presences of the long half-life fission
products. The most important of these long half-life fission products are,
. . 10 . d d' d f·· 129 1 99T 93m.·bas seen 1n Fl g. ,~n escen lng or er 0 ~mportance, , C, N,
135C d 93z 'rh f ...f' d . . h 1 ts an r. ere ore to ga~n a s1gn1 1cant re uct10n 1n t e ong- erm
1) Note from Figs. 13, 17, 20 and 22 that the transrnutation of the
actinides would result in no significant reduction in short-term
hazards.
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hazard of the waste it will also be necessary to treat these five long
half-life fission products. The essence of the argument here is that if
one considers recycling the actinides one must at the same time consider
a disposal procedure for the above named five fission products. The so-
lution to the problem of long-term hazard reducticn by transmutaticn
hinges on a solution to both problems.
Finally,it must be pointed out that the subsequent separation of select-
ed isotopes from the waste stream is itself not without associated pro-
blems even if we can cleanly burn the selected isotopes. As evident from
fuel reprocessing one would generate large volumes of contaminated chem-
icals, water, and air which must be properly treated. Therefore,the
risks associated with the extra handling and process releases involved
in separation of the isotopes from the waste stream and subsequent
transmutation must be weighed against the reduction in a future risk,
due to the presence of these isotopes,by use of the concept of social
rate of discount explained in section 111. C.
Tc get an impression of the size and importance of the problem the
production of the important actinide isotopes, other than uranium
and plutonium, in representative reactors is given in Table 11. In
combination with the nuclear energy strategy given in section 11 of
this paper the annual and accumulated production of neptunium, amer-
iciuM, and curium in the BRD are given in Tab1e 12. The annual pro-
duction of these isotopes is shown graphically in Fig. 24.
For the purpose of illustration let us assume a concept for the
transmutation of these isotopes. vJe could reasonably assume that the
isotopes wou1d be concentrated in a special element, or elements, to
be placed in the reactors from which they originated. The system
might look like the following.
Table 11
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Actinide Production in Representative Reactors
(grams per ton of fuel reprocessed at 150 days)
Isotope u~l) Lt-7R2) LMFBR3) LMFBR4) THTRS) HTGR6)
Neptunium ')00 ' 368 263 271 1260 1090
Americium 153 774 959 259 11 36
Curium 43 522 22 5 3 19
Protactinium 52 68
1) P~VR operating wi th equilibrium uranium fuel cycle to 34,000
MWD/T burnup
2) P~ operating with Pu-recycle fuel (19% of fissile charge is
plutonium) to 34.000 ffi~/T burnup
3) Sodium cooled fast breeder reactor with core and blanket mixed
proportionally at reprocessing, light water reactor plutonium
fuel, average burnup 34,OOO~ID/T
4) Sodium cooled fast breeder reactor with core and blanket mixed
proportionally at reprocessing. fast breeder reactor equilibrium
plutonium fuel, average burnup 34 ,000 M'~/T
5) high temperature gas cooled thermal reactor operating with
equilibrium 233U recycle fuel to 65.000 MWD/T burnup
6) high temperature gas cooled thermal reactor operating with
equilibrium high enriched (93%) 235U fuel cycle to 65.000
Ht-."D IT burnup
Tab1e 12
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Production of Neptunium, Americium, and Curium ~n the BRD
1980 1990 2000 2010
INSTALLED CAPACITY, GWe 20 63 155 316
Annual Production, kg/year
l\eptunium 178 627 1579 3158
Americium 55 229 1018 2789
Curium 15 54 135 270
Accumulated, kg
Neptunium 697 4485 15221 38383
Americium 213 1465 7193 25412
. 1) 60 386 1307 3291Cur~um
1) includes daughter products (plutonium)
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In this scheme the left-hand loop of the special cycle could be
broken away from the reactor and fed through any other type of
transmuting device, e.g. an accelerator.
Duc to the high neutron source associated with the curium isotopes t
it is reasonable to assume that special facilities could be needed to
handle the special elements containing the actinides to be trans-
muted. In addition, it would probably not be desirable to mix the
actinides with the fuel mixture of the reactor and suffer an overall
fuel handling and fabrication penalty.
In the above scheme we assume optimistically that the actinides can
be separated from the fission products with a decontamination factor
(DF) of 104 for all the isotopes and that thc waste stream in the
reprocessing facility can be decontaminated to a factor of 107 • In
addition, we assume that the special elements can rero~in in the reactor
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or other transmuting device to the point that 10% of the atoms present
have fissioned. For metal1urgical reasons the special elements would
have to be removed after 10% burnup and reprocessed. Therefore, ten
passes through the reactor would be needed to fission all the atoms
original1y present in the element in its first loading into the reactor.
4Therefore,with DF = 10 and ten passes around the cycle the cumulative
loss to the fission product waste stream would be
104 x (10/10 + 9/10 + 8/10 + • • 1/10) = 0.00055
of the actinides originally associated with the fission products. The
composition of the actinides would be tilted toward the higher end of
the isotope chart due to the neutron capture reactions. This,
however, would probably not be an important point except possibly 1n
the handling procedures due to the higher spontaneous neutron fission
source. Notice that if the DF was not large, and the number of passes
around the cycle was not kept to aminimum, the cumulative 10ss to the
waste stream wauld be large due ta the additive effect.
With these data and the accumulated production of neptunium, americium
and curium in the BRD ta the year 2010, there wauld be appraximately the
following quantities in the fission product wastes and the biosphere.
Element In F.P. i-laste (kg) In Biosphere (gm)
Np 21.1 2. 1
Am 13.9 1.4
Cm 1.8 0.2
The DF = 104 for the actinides in the wastes would put the heavy metal
hazards, see Figs. 10 and 11, at 103 years between that of 1291 and
99Tc for the P~~'s and the LMFBR's. The THTR and HTGR heavy metal
curves lay flatter and lower than those for the P~~'s and the LMFBR's,
therefore in these cases the gain is slightly larger but qualita-
tively not different.
Nevertheless, assuming that the same decantanimation factors are also
obtainable in the normal fuel reprocessing facility, regardless of
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whether we aspire to transmute the actinides or not, the decision
to transmute the actinides would result in roughly 5.5 times the
amount of heavy metal isotopes deposited in the environment had we
not chosen to transmute the actinides. ~he quest ion is, HIs this
equal to, ür less than, the achievable reduction of future risks as
viewed from the present?".
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A2. Deep Space Disposal
Since the days of dwindling interest and funding for space research
and exploration, the use of space technology to solve the problem of
radioactive waste management has been increasingly advocated. Studies
evaluating the alternatives of extraterrestrial transport of the
wastes have been published /38, 39, 40/. The two overriding problems
with this type of a disposal concept are the cost and short-term
safety (safety ~n the senSe of today~ hazards in contrast to hazards
to future generations). Cost is directly a function of the launch
trajectory (earth escape or solar impact) and the waste-to-payload
ratio.
To put the problem in perspective it is necessary to evaluate the
amount of "rocket power" necessary to dispose of the wastes that
will be produced in the BRD. Up to the year 2010 it is estimated
that approximately 88,000 tons of fuel will have been reprocessed.
(See Table 4 in Section 11. C3.) This fuel will have an average
burnup of about 34,000 MWD/T. The composition of the waste will
include about 36kg of fission products and about 10 kg of heavy
metals per ton, assuming a 1.0% 10ss cf uranium and plutonium dur-
ing fuel reprocessing. This means that up to the year 2010, 4050 tons
of waste will have been produced. In the year 2010, using the same
figures, the annual production rate of waste will be 415 tons. The
payload cf a Saturn V rocket for solar orbit is about 35 tons. As-
suming optimistically a waste-to-paylcad ration of 25%, one would
need four Saturn V launches a month by the year 2010 to handle the
total wastes of the BRD. It would be, of course, absurd to consider
disposing of all the wastes in space. A significant fraction of the
waste is ei ther stable or of fairly short half-life (tl / 2 < 10 years).
If we partitionthe fission product wastes iuto elements having
radioactive isotopes with half-Hfes greater than 10 years the
total amount, per ton of fuel at 34,000 MWD/T, would be only about
14kg for both the PWR's and the LM7BR's. Ihis in essence would
halve the number cf launches needed. Nevertheless, it still is a
significant number, ass~~ing cf course that the waste-to-payload
ratio could be achieved.
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Preliminary results of Platt and Ramsey /39/ indicate that one
would suffer a prohibitive penalty for materials requiring sub-
stantial shielding for gamma emissions or Bremstrahlung. It appears,
therefüre, that payloads would have to be restricted to partitioned
fractions of the radioactive waste consisting of the transuranics
contaminated by 0.1 to 1.0% of the fission products. Based on this
result the ultimate disposal schemes appear to be suitable, with
present day technology, only for the "ultimate" disposal of the
actinides. Using the,data of Table 12 in section V. Al, the annual
production of neptunium, americium, and curium by the year 2010 is
roughly 6200 kg. In addition, 1% of the fission product wastes
would amount to about 3250 kg more. Assuming again an optimistic
waste-to-payload ratio of 25% one would need slightly more than
one launch per year for the BRD in the year 2010 to dispose of the
annual production of actinides by placing them in a solar orbit.
The risk from waste disposal by extraterrestrial transportation
can be assigned to five separate segments of the launch procedure.
These are
1) prelaunch handling accident,
2) launch-pad mishap (explosion of rocket),
3) mishap during ascent of the rocket be-
tween launch-pad and the approach to orbit,
4) failure to orbit,
and 5) reentry into the atmosphere after successful
orbit has been achieved.
A more detailed discvssion of the safety problems associated with the
launehing into space of nuclear materials is given by Branch and
Connor /41/. They consider hazards control for satellite nuclear
auxiliary power (SNAP) devices. These are basically isotope and
small reactor units, total radioactivity of which would be of the
order of magnitude of a megacurie (MCi) or less. They suggest that
these power units be designed to burn up upon reentry since they
feel this would result in the lowest possible hazards. In fact,on
on April 24, 1964, a Transit navigational sa~ellite with a SNAP unit
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(designated SNAP-9A) containing 17 kCi, or about lkg of 238pu , failed
to achieve orbit /42/. Subsequent measurements of 238pu in the atmos-
phere confirmed that the SNAP-9A unit had burned up upon reentry into
the atmosphere. This accidental release of 238pu almost tripled the
global deposit of this plutonium isotope by 1970. The global deposit
of 238pu from weapons testing is estimated to he about 7.7 + 0.9 kCi.
However, due to the larger radioactivity of waste disposal launches,
it would not be desirable to design for burn up upon reentry. There-
fore the design of the containers to survive reentry and impact is
considerably more difficult. In addition, it would be desirable for
the containers to withstand melting as long as possible after impact
to facilitate after accident clean up operations. An analysis of
these types of waste containers is given by Van Bibber and Paker /43/.
As in the preceding section, the assumed additional hazards (short-
term) of disposal by extraterrestrial transportation must more than
compensate the reduction in the long-term hazards of the wastes, as
evaluated by a social rate of discountconcept if the concept i5 to
be used. Assuming that the actinides could be removed from the waste
stream with a decontamination factor of 104 , asin the preceding sec-
tion, than the long-term hazards of the heavy metals would lay between
that due to 1291 and 99Tc (see, for example, Figs. 10 and 11).
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B. Long-Term Disposal
To reiterate the meaning attached to the term long-term disposal we refer
to disposal on or in the earth in such a manner that the wastes are, for
all practical purposes, nonretrievable. The risks associated with such schenles
is that it is conceivable, although with a sma1l prouability, of the
wastes returning in an uncontrollable manner to man's biosphere.
The schen,es that are considered here are the following:
1) Disposal 1.n salt deposits
2) Disposal 1.n a nuclear cavity (Plot.share Concept)
3) Disposal under an 1.ce sheet (Antarctica)
4) Disposal 1.n the earth's crust by self-hurial.
ll1is list is by no means exhaustive. For example, there are other proposals
sIlch as disposal in tectonic sinks, in vaults excavated in crystalline rock,
and by hydraulie-fracturing. However, while these and others purposed sche-
mes differ in detail from the four listed above,the problems encountered are
not signifieantly different than the ones to be resolved in any of the four
schemes above.
rll. Disposal in salt deposits
Disposal of high-level waste in salt deposits has bepn studied intensively
both in the United States and the BRD. In the Uni ted States the concept is
to use bedded salt deposits /44/ and in the BRD salt domes /45/. In either
ease the basic design is similar.
The advantages of salt over other rock types as a medium for the disposal of
waste are listed here in the following:
(1) Isolation from water over a long period
(2) Plastic properties under hydrostatic pressure
(3) Good thermal properties
(4) Ease of mining
(5) Generally in zones of low seismicity.
The primary disadvantage of salt is its high solubility in water. However the
very presence of salt in massive bodies beneath the ground attests to the fact
that salt has, in general, been isolated from circulating ground water. For
any form of geologie storage, it is probably through transport in ground water
that buried wastes would most likely come into contact with man's environment.
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The procedures involved ~n the disposal of wastes in salt deposits are the
following;
(1) I~terim storage as a liquid
(2) Waste converted to an encapsulated solid
(3) Interim storage as asolid
(4) Transported to site of a previously excavated salt deposit
(5) ~aste lowered through a shaft inta the mine
(6) Transported in a carrier to a room in the m1ne and placed in
preexcavated vertical hole in the floor.
(7) Crushed salt is put in the hole to fill it for shielding ( -2m).
(8) The process is continued until all the holes in the room are filled.
The room will then be backfilled with crushed salto
The possible arrangement of the waste cylinders in such a concept is sho~m
in Fig.25. The distance between the waste cylinders in dicta ted by the max-
imum allowable salt-temperature between the cylinders. The heat generation
rete of the cylinder is determined by the volume fraction of waste to inert
s0lid composing the cylinder, and the age of the waste (see Tables 5 to 10).
The solification of high-level waste, a step inherent in the concept of
disposal in salt, is under intensive investigation around the world today.
Tile procedure under investigation in the ERD has been recently reviewed by
~rause i46i. It must be mentioned that the solidification processes generally
gen~rate low-level aqueous waste liquid which must be treated in aseparate
system and some of the radioactive elements are released with an effluent
~a3 stream.
letrievability of the waste cylinders from the salt is 1n principle. pos-
sille, but there is no doubt that it would be an extremely difficult
operation. Conceivable waste ccnta1ners could not be expected to remain
intact more than a few years. If it were necessary to retrieve the waste
cylinders t they would have to be mined out. For all practical purposes
tbe waste should oe considered as nonretrievable for our calculations of
~otential hazards.
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Definition of "Zero Point" ~n Time
For the eons ideration of the safety. or risk to the pub lie. 0 f this dis-
posal eoneept one is faeed 'vith a very diffieult problem; namely that
it is neeessary to eonsider a very long time span. equal to that of a geo-
logieal time seale. A very important ques tion at this point is: How lang
a time should we eonsider the waste as dangerous? Obviously not to the
point that the last atom has deeayed. Therefore it may be eonvenient to
define a point, between the time the wastes are buried in the salt and
infini ty, after whieh time We ,,'ould not consider the wasteas dangerous. A
possible rneans of doing so may be by comparing the wastes to existing
natural radioactive sources, as uranium and thorium ore depasits, as ori-
ginally purposed by Bell and Dillon /47/.
1'0 make such a eomparison we use the solidifieation process as reviewed
by Krause /46/ and the spac~ng scheme shown in Fig.25. Directly associa-
ted with the wastes of one ton of fuel (see Tables 5 to 10) is 220 m3
or 505 tons of salto
This value is calculated by assuming 80 liters of glass for the waste of
one ton of spent fuel at a burnup of 34 000 MHD/T. From simple geometry
and the data in Fig. 25 one can calculate the associated quantity of salt
radially outward from the waste cylinder. Using the definition of the
hazard index as given by Eq. (I) in Section IV one finds /47/:
(I) 1.0 grn of natural uranium ~n equilibrium with its daughters
~
HI = 15. I rn-HzO/ern U
(2) 1.0 gm of thorium in equilibrium with its daughters
3HI = 3.78 m H20/gm Th
Assuming an average concentration of uranium and thorium in the eartßs crust
of 4 ppm and 12 ppm. respectively, one computes ahazard index for 505 tons
of average earth's crust of
4HI (ave. earth's crust) = 5.35x10 •
A typical uranium ore deposit is generally of the order of 0.2% U308 •
Thorium is closely associated mineralogically with uranium and is generally
found in uranium ore. We shall assume a Th/U ratio of one. Therefore,505 tons
of typical uranium ore would have a hazard index of
HI (uranium ore) = 1.68xI07 •
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Uranium and thorium are present in a higher concentration in mineral monazite
which occurs in beach sand in some areas of India, Brazil, Malaysia, and the
southeastern United States. India monazite has a ThOZ content of 8 to 10.57-
and uranium content of 0.3 to 0.4%. Typically 2 to 2.5% of the sand is mona-
zite. Using the lower value of these figures a hazard index for the sand is
calculated to be
HI(monazite) 6"" 3.04xlO.
Another possible consideration 1n this respect would be to compare the amount
of water necessary to dissolve the 505 tons of salt to a potable concentration
of 500 ppm NaCl. This would be 1.01x106 m3H203 or a value between the HI (ave.
earth's crust) and HI(uranium ore).
From Fig. 10 and 22 one sees that the point equal to the HI(uranium ore) is
4
reached at about 10 years for all the waste types. One would say that roughly
410 years is a time span over which the wastes could be considered dangerous.
For comparative purposes we may also use what was believed to be a natural
fission reactor in the uranium ore deposits of Oklo in Africa, as reported
in Atomwirtschaft /48/ and Energie Nucleaire /49/. The low content of 235U
(~ 0.6%) in the uranium, which is significantly below that which is gener-
ally found, led scientists to an investigation. The conclusion of the in-
vestigation was that a chain reaction, as in nuclear reac.tors of today, had
taken place. From isotope correlations it was established that the original
235 9
enrichment of the ore was about 3% U about 1.74x10 years ago. With a
high concentration of uranium in the ore and the possible presence of water,
a chain reaction over a long time period (> 104 years) took place. The chain
reaction is believed to have discontinued more than 108 years ago. Present
d . f h h' f 235 d l' .ay concentrat1on 0 t e ore, at t e p01nt 0 greatest U ep et1on, lS
14.9 gm U/IOO gm minerals.
A hazard index for this "reactor" and its wastes was calculated, in the same
manner as explained above, from the time the "reactor" was operating until
today. The total hazard index in the last 108 years has decreased slowly,
dropping only slightly more than an order of magnitude. For 505 tons of are
today the hazard index is
HI(Oklo) 9== 1.14xl0.
From the curves for the wastes from the various reactor types one see that
this hazard index is passed in all cases in less than 300 years.
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The above arguments ;Jssurnc that the most probable accident for a disposal
scheme involving waste burial in salt deposits is an entrance of water to
the burial cavern. As is discussed in the following this ~s considered to
be thc most probable accident and has been so designated in other works /50/.
Also assumed is that once the water has entElred the burial cavern it will
flow out again. This assumption is not with solid foundation since, as
proven in salt mining experience, water in a flooded salt mine generally
remains in the mine. In addition the solidified wastes are not readily
soluble. Leach rates for g1ass, which of course depend On temperature,
chemical composition of the glass, element 1eached, and age of the glass,
-4 -7 2have been measured to be of the order of magnitude of 10 to 10 gm/cm /day
/51/. Simi1ar arguments can also be considered for the uranium ore deposits
and their calcu1ated hazard index. For examp1e, monazite sand i8 among the
least soluble of natura11y occurring materials. Very roughly one could say
these effects compensate each other so that our comparison above i8 not
entire1y false.
Accident Si tuations in the Waste Facili ty
The initiation of an accident in a waste facility could result either from
intentional, or unintentiona1, human activities or from geological processes.
In this context it is convenient to consider accident situations in two dif-
ferent time periods • First is the geologically short time period when the
waste facility 1S in operation (waste being brought into the facility) and
the geologically long time per iod when the disposal facility i8 sealed. The
factors involved in these two time periods are not identical.
1) During Operation of Waste Facility
To logical1y relate the factors involved in the release of radioactive
material from the waste faci1ity a fault tree, shown in Fig. 26, was con~
structed. One notices that there are two basic types of release initiating
accidents, the more or less random accidents due to human error and the
geologica1 accident (flooding of the mine) which, while initiated due to human
error, wou1d not be considered as random. Except for the flooding of the
mine the other accidents could be easily controlled and contained through
proper instrumentation and immediate personnel actions. The flooding of the
raine can be effectively engineered against, and 'tvould have to be considered
as a high1y improbable accident. However,should such an accident occur it
wou1d be difficult to bring the facility back into operation and/or guarantee
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the safety of the wastes already disposed. If the mine were flooded it
is not likely that the water would flow out again. It could be pumped
out and treated as contaminated water. However, if the water were to
come into a Uhot" area where wastes had already been deposited, waste
cylinders could be exposed if achamber were to collapse.
To attach probabilities to the events in the fault tree of Fig. 26 is a
very difficult job since to date there does not exist much experience
in the disposal of high-level radioactive wastes in salt deposits. The
use of statistical data for the flooding of salt mines would be unfair
since the precautions to prevent the flooding of a salt mine prepared
for the disposalof radioactive wastes would be considerably more ex-
tensive than those for anormal salt mine. It is probably reasonable
to assume here that the waste disposal facility would be so designed
that if flooding did occur it would not be possible for the water to
flow to the region containing exposed chambers in active use for dis-
posal.
The handling of waste cylinders at the disposal facility Would, in some
ways, be comparable to the handling of spent fuel elements at nuclear
power plants or fuel reprocessing facilities. The waste cylinders and
spent fuel elements both must be shielded against their intense radio-
aetivity and eooled because of their inherent large heat source. For
example, the elass 6 and 7 accidents of the USAEC for nuclear power
plants are the following:
1) elass 6
2) Class 7
Refueling Accident Inside Reactor
Containment
Accidents to Spent Fuel Outside of
Reactor Containment.
If we substitute Waste Disposal Facility for Reactor Containment and waste
cylinder for fuel element in the above we have a very comparable situation.
The same applies for fuel reproeessing faeilities where the elass 4 aeei-
dent is "Fuel Handling Aecidents Involving Cladding Failure".
From experienee gained in the operation of nuclear power plants we ean get
an idea of -the frequency of h~~n errors which lead to significant events~
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A compilation of da ta colleeted for the three years 1970-1972, as pub-
lished in Ref. /52/, gives an average probability of an event per faeil-
ity-month of 0.05 due to human error. As defined here a significant event
due to human failure includes the failure to follow procedures, which in
most cases would not endanger the publie in any manner. A waste disposal
faeility would certainly not approach the complexity of apower reactor
system. Therefore, we shall use a faetor of 10 to describe the differ-
ence in eomplexity between the two types of facilities. In addition, we
shall assume that only one in a hundred human errors would result in a
subsequent release of radioaetive material. Therefore, the probability
of arelease event oecurring due to human error is 0.00005!month, or
0.0006!year. It has been observed that on the order of half of the ac-
cidents occurring in nuclear reactor power plants ean be traced to human
error. Therefore to adjust our probability of an event occurring to in-
elude all causes we multiply by 2, or P • 0.0012!year.
r
Similar accident probabilities have also been estimated, based in part
on past experience, for fuel reproeessing facilities. The probability
estimated in a fuel reprocessing facility /53/ for fuel handling acci-
dents involving cladding failure is Pr • 0.05 to 0.075/year. In a
1000 MWe reactor approximately 30 tons of fuel are handled per year,
where as in a large reprocessing facility on the order of 1500 tons of
fuel are handled per year, or 50 times as much. Basically this can be
interpreted as the accident is about 50 times more likely to happen in
a year at the fuel reprocessing facility than at the power plant. Ad-
justing our estimated probability trom the power plant tor this tactor,
Pr = 0.OO12x50 • 0.06/year
we find that it fits relatively weIl with the probability estimated for
the fuel reproeessing facility.
After the spent tuel elements have been reprocessed and the wastes treated
for disposal the reduction in volume/weight would be approximately 20% of
that associated with the originally fuel elements. If we assume that a
waste disposal facility would handle the wastes from five reprocessing
facilities (7500 tons of fuel/year) the amount of handling, and probab-
ility of a handling accident in a year, would be our estimated value, Pr'
above.
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2) After elosure of Waste Faeility
After the waste faeility has reaehed its designed capacity it will be
permanently sealed and, for many years thereafter, guarded against un-
intentional entry. The ground surfaee of the faeility will probably also
be monitored formany years after elosure for the purpose of deteeting
releases. However, one eould not expeet these aetivities to eontinue for
the time period of 10,000 years, defined in a previous section as the
period of danger for the wastes. During such a long period of time geo-
logie processes ean playa very important role along with other faetors.
An exe.ellent colleetion of data on geologie processes relevant to the
disposal of waste in geologie formations is given by F. Gera and D.G.
Jaeobs /54/.
A eonsideration of the events which could lead to the release of radio-
aetive materials from the waste disposal faeility over very long periods
of time has resulted in the fault tree shown in Fig. 27. This fault tree
was not intended to serve for the caleulation of the probability of the
top event. This is presently not possible aS geology has been a science
with very limited predietive eapabilities. However, from the fault tree
one is able to get a logieal ordering of the events.
Many of the faetors in the fault tree ean be designed against by eareful
seleetion of the loeation of the waste facility. In addition, the geologie
processes are very regional dependent so that one eannot, in general, make
a statement eoncerning the possible effeets of these processes. Under the
assumption that what has not happened in the past will not happen in the
near future (~ 100,000 years), a site would be seleeted that is tectonic
stable, experienees a low rate of erosion, and has no reeord of volcanic
activity. This assumption is not neeessarily valid in the worid of today
in which the influence of man on his environment is ever increasing. A
ease in point is an incident that occurred several years aga in the moun-
tain region near Denver, Colorado, USA. The injection of liquid ehemieal
wastes ioto underground eaverns was haI ted when earth tremors were ex-
perienced in an area that had had no previous reeords of such tremors.
It is, nevertheless, instruetive to diseuss ehe range of ehe variables
in the fault tree.
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Erosion is controlled by climate, relief and the lithological nature
of the materials subject to erosion, and also by human activity. Ero-
sion rates vary from 10-100 cm/IOOO years with most of the data in
the range 20 to 50 cm/IOOO years. It is believed that glacial erosion
has cut to depths of 600 to 1300 m. For example, the present rate of
erosion of the Muir Glacier in southern Alaska is 2000 cm/IODO years.
Glaciers are known to move at an average rate of about 10 m/year. The
last glacial retreat occurred only about 12,500 to 15,000 years ago.
The next ice aga is expected to occur in about 10,000 to 50,000 years
from now. Uplift seems to be very time dependent, but the average over
long periods of time (10,000 years) runs about 3 to 10 mm/year.
The impact of a large meteorite could be considered as a random process
and, therefore, the probability of the incident could be estimated. Blake
/55/ has calculated the probability of meteorite impact on the earth as
a function of meteor weight. If we consider only those meteors having
the capability of cratering at least to 200 to 300 m (meteors ~ 107 kg)
the probability of impact on land is approximately 1Ö t2 to 10- i3 /kmZ/
year, assuming aland surface of 130xl06 km2 • Assuming that the total
committed surface area to waste disposa1 is 100 km2, the probability
of an impactoccurring in 100,000 years is 10-5 to 10-6 • However, the
short-term effects of the impact of a meteor of the size considered
here would undoubted1y be far greater than the exhumation of radioac-
tive wastes. This same remark applies also to the detonation of a nuc-
lear wespon at the surface of the waste disposal facility.
One is not able to reasonably estimate the probability of someone ac-
cidentally drilling through the waste disposal faci1ity in search of
minerals. For example, it is not uncommon to find oi1 and gas fields
bearing up against salt domes. Therefore, the probability of someone
drilling near a disposal facility within 104 years is, probably, quite
large.
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B2. Disposal in a Nuclear Cavity (Plowshare Concept)
A method has recently been proposed by J.J. Cohen, A.E. Lewis and R.L.
Braun /56/ for the incorporation of radioactive wastes from fuel repro-
cessing in malten silicate rock. It involves the placement of the liquid
wastes from a fuel reprocessing facility, with little or no treatment,
in a deep underground cavity created by nuclear explosives. The concept
simplifies the waste disposal problem in that interim storage, secondary
treatment, and transportation of the wastes are eliminated. The fuel re-
processing facility would be located in the elose vieinity cf the eavity.
The cavity would be created below a considerable thickness of impermeable
rock at a depth of 2 to 3 km in silicate rock as shown conceptually in
Fig. 28. High-level wastes, as weIl as intermediate - and low-level wastes,
would be injected into the cavity. The temperature of the rock would have
to be maintained below its melting point during operation of the facility
by adding cooling water. For this reason two bore holes to the cavity
would be required, one for waste and cooling water addition and the other
for return of steam. The steam would be condensed and recirculated to cool
the cavity or processed for reuse in the reprocessing facility. The entire
concept is a closed system. If for some reason the flow of cooling water
to the eavity is disrupted the cavity and access holes would melt. It would
be, coneeivably, difficult to initiate operation of the cavity again.
When the cavity has reached its capacity its access holes would be per-
manently sealed. The rock surrounding the cavity would then begin to
melt due to the lack of cooling. The molten rock cavity would increase
in size for a number of years after closure of the access holes until a
heat balance is established. When the molten rock begins to cool and
solidify the radioactive wastes would be incorporated into the rock.
The concept, as envisioned by Cohen et ale /56/, entails a cavity created
by a 5 kt nuclear device with a useful service life of 25 years connected
to a 1500 ton per year fuel reprocessing facility. After closure of the
cavity a maximum melt radius of 96 m would be reached within 65 years.
Therefore, the wastes from one ton of reprocessed fuel would be incor-
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porated in about 100 m3 of rock. Comparing this waste incorporated into
the rocks with uranium ore of an equivalent amount, as done in the pre-
vious section for disposal in salt deposits, we find a hazard index of
HI (uranium ore) 7• 0.7IxlO.
In comparison to the salt deposits the time span in which the waste can
be considered Ildangerous" is about 20,000 years longer. However, in the
event that something does happen the wastes in this concept are not in
as favorable a form as in the salt deposits. Forseveral hundred years
after closure of the cavity the rock and wastes will remain molten.
Therefore, if a large enough volume of water enters the cavity it is
conceivable that a significant pressure build up could occur, forcing
the molten rock and wastes out of the cavity, possibly to the surface
of the earth. In other words, one could obtain a "geyser" effec.t. How-
ever, whenmost of the short half-life fission products have decayed,
in about 1000 years, the remaining fission products and actinideswill
be incorporatedin an insoluble silicate rock matrix deep underground.
In addition, because of the high temperature cf the wastes in this con=
cept the volatile isotopes will be driven out of the wastes. They, there-
fore, would need to be treated separately. The cooling water that circu-
lates in the closed system would become highly tritiated (3H : HTO) in a
short time, thereby, presenting an increased radiation hazard to the per-
sonnel working in the facility, as the activity of the cooling water could
reach as high as 1 Ci/m3 •
Because of the molten state of the waste and rock for a long period of
time the heavier isotopes (ac.tinides) will probably concentrate toward
the bottom of the cavity. Over the estimated 25 year life of the facility
approximately 37 tons of ac.tinides will have been injected into the cavity.
As a point of reference the c.ritical mass of 244Cm is of the order of
24120 kg /57/ and Am abcut 100 kg /58/.
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B3. Disposal under an Ice Sheet (Antarctica)
lce has severai advantageous features common with salt if its average
temperature is maintained weIl below the freezing point. Its fractures
are self-healing through recrystallization or plastic flow. In addi-
tion, it is impermeable to water and has a relatively high heat con-
ductivity compared to rock. The polar regions comprise about one-
twelfth of the earth's surface and are extremeiy remote areas of the
earth.
Zeller and Saunders /59/ have recently proposed the establishment of
an international radioactive waste disposal facility in Antarctica.
They suggest that the best location for such a facility would be near
the "pole of unaccessibility". As suggested, the tops of ridges in the
underlying bed rock are the most favorable. Here the temperature at
the rock/ice interface should be lower than in the basins. This area
has a land elevation of over 3000 meters above sea level and an ice
thickness of 1000 m to 3000 m. The area is about 1300 km inland from
the edge of the continent. This distance is a safety factor for the
buried wastes, but a hazard for the transport of the wastes.
In this concept the radioactive wastes would be solidified, as in the
salt deposit concept, into glass cylinders. The waste containers would
be shipped annually (in January) by special ships to the Antarctica
and then transported overland by sledge to the waste facility. Placed
on the ice the hot cylinders would melt their own emplacement shafts
to a final resting place. The emplacement shafts would self-heal within
a short period. For the sizes and heat generation rates under considera-
tion, the cylinders would sink at rates of about a meter per day. This
would mean a total sinking time of 3 to 5 years for an ice depth of
about 1500 m.
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When the waste cylinders have reached the rock/ice interface they
should remain stationary for several hundred years, due to heat gen-
eration, and not be subject to ice flow. After this period of initial
heating the waste will probably movewith the ice flow. As mentioned
1n the section on salt deposits,glaciers move on the average about
10 m/year. Under the most unfavorable conditions of straight line
continuous movement of the waste they could reach theAntarctica
continent edge in about 150,000 years. More important than glacier
movement rates may be the presence of fluid water between the rock
and ice. Such water could transport radioisotopes rather rapidly.
As evident by the heated debate in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists /69/, following the publication of an article by Zeller, Saunders
and Angino /61/ on this subject, the possibility of an ice surge, ini-
tiated by the next ice age in 10,000 to 50,000 years or by conditions
due to the hot waste cylinders, is taken seriously. Such an ice surge
could transport the wastes relatively fast to the sea.
With present day knowledge it would appear that the disposal of wastes
under the ice cap of the Antarctica should be limited to the short
half-life fission products (t 1/ 2 < 50 years). Therefore, this disposal
scheme would on1y be a partial solution to radioactive wastes. For ex-
ample, the long half-life fission products and actinides would have
to be disposed by one of the other methods considered in this paper.
From a risk point of view the probability that the wastes will be un-
intentionally uncovered i8 considerably less in the ,Antarctica than
on other continents. However, the risk due to transportation accidents
is considerably greater.
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B4. Disposal in the Earth's Crust by Self-Burial
The concept of self-hurial of radioactive wastes has recently been
proposed by Donea et. ale /62/ of Ispra, and Logan /63/ of the Uni ted
States. According to this concept. high-level wastes encased in a
metal sphere would be allowed to melt their own emplacement shaft in
rock. The spheres would probably be released from an initial pre-
drilled depth of about 2 .km, and descend by gravity to greater
depths utilising the decay heat from the incapsuled radioactive
wastes. Descent times and final depth achieved would depend on the
heat source density of the radioactive material, the type of rock
the sphere descends through, and the size, shape and material of the
capsules.
The results of calculations by Logan /63/ for descent through basalt
rock indicate that 1m diameter sphere containing a 30% volume fraction
of fission products would come to rest at approximately 16.2 km in
105 years. The same capsule with only actinides w~uld reach 10.2 km
in 96 years, or with only the elements of strontium and cesium it
penetrates the earth's crust and enters the mantle, thereby achieving
depths greater than 50 km.
It would probability be necessary, for economic reasons, to use the
same implantation hole for many succeeding waste capsules. The
drilling cost for an emplacement hole of 2km depth is estimated at
roughly one million U.S. dollars /56/.
The concept is similar to the ice sheet concept (sec.don V. R3) in that
the wastes melt their own emplacement shaft, and similar to the
nuclear cavity concept (section V. B2) in that the wastes, after
following the same trail, would accumulate in the same general area
(therefore waste concentration). The 8pplication of this waste dis-
posal concept would require an extension of present day technology.
The risks in this concept are initially in the handling phase of the
disposal (solidification and transportation of wastes) and later
result from the possible escape to the environment of material after
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the capsules have been released. The waste solidification and trans-
portation phase would not be qualitatively different than the same in
the salt deposit concept (section V. BI). Both concepts entail the
handling of hot capsules that must be cooled. After the capsules
had been released they would be essentially irretievable, and they
would probably concentrate somewhat after reaching their maximum
depth. In this respect the long-term risk from this concept is
similar to that in the nuclear cavity concept (section V. B2).
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C. Storage
Almost any high-level waste management scheme involves an interim stor-
age of the wastes as liquid and/or solid. The reason being that there
are practical and economic advantages tö be gained by allowing many fis-
sion products with short and intermediate half-lives to decay prior to
additional waste processing. In addition, there is a growing element of
the nuclear community that is advocating storage of radioactive wastes,
not as an ultimate solution but rather as a temporary solution. The ar-
gument is that the safety of present day disposal concepts must be ade-
quately demonstrated before disposal of the wastes is initiated, since
as seen in the previous section, retrievability of the wastes can not
be assumed. From storage the waste could be retrieved at any time for
further treatment and management. From today's state of development the
demonstration of disposal safety would require something of the order
of 20 years. As a result, the concept of "Engineered Storage" /64/ has
surfaced in the United States. The idea involved is to store solidified
high-level wastes for aperiod up to 100 years in speeially prepared
buildings. It is assumed that within this period of time an aceeptable
waste disposal facilities will be able to go into operation.
For safety reasons it is assumed that any type of storage facility would
be loeated in an area that is teetonically stable and in which the geo-
logie materials in the surrounding vieinity have a low permeability and
a high ion exchange capacity. These last eriteria are advantageous to
hamper the movement of any ground released aetivlty.
Cl. Storage of Liquid Wastes
For the storage of the waste as liquids in tanks, the eauses of aetivity
release would be eonsidered to be one of the following:
1) tank corrosion
2) loss of eooling
3) hydrogen explosion
4) external causes (earthquake, sabotage, flood, ete.).
These release mechanisms are discussed below.
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In a safety analysis of liquid tank storage performed at OR..~L /65/ it was
the opinion of the authors that the most likely ti1echanism of a major release
of radioaetive material would be lass of eooling. To date, however, tank
eorrosion has been the only eause of tank failure. There have also been
ineidents of release during filling or transferring of liquid wastes eaused
by operator error or plugged pipes /66/.
1) Tank Corrosion
Same insights into the problems of liquid tank storage can be gained from
the experience in the United States where a very large volume (-3.xI05 m3)
has been handled to data. This experience was recently reviewed by Lenne-
mann /67/ of the USAEC. Of the 198 tanks bullt since 1944, 20 have leaked,
all eaused by either structural stress or corrosion. Some leaked shortly
after they were placed in service andothers after aperiod longer than the
expected average life. A surmnary of these tank failures in given in the
following Table 13. The data for the last tank leakage given in the table
was compiled separately from ReL/68/. At the time of this last leakage the
total amount of liquid in storage was about 1.6xi05 m3; therefore approxima-
tely 0.37. of the total liquid waste stored was released. In only one incident
i8 it believed that the wastes have entered. ground water. Generally the
wastes have remained in the surrounding soil. Although some generaHzations
concerning the relative degree of fixation of the principle radioisotopes in
soil are possible, their behavior is so dependent on factors such as rate
and amount of rainfall, drainage, etc. that general quantitative forecasts
are not practical at this time.
Studies have shown that, for example, 90 Sr migrates at a rate cf about 1.1
to 1.3 cm/day through soils that have moderately high exchange capacity and
that are permeated with ground water. Since the mean life of a 90sr atom is
about 40 years, the mean distance the isotope could traverse before decay
would be less than 200 m under the same conditions. In addition, it has been
confirmed that 137cs is more tightly bound by soil than 90Sr • A general remark
in this re!i'ect is that the capaclty of the solls to store fission products
in ionic form seems to be substantial as confirmed bymeasurements. The trans-
uranium isotopes would be expected to migrate considerably further than either
137e - 9-0,., ... .. , ~ •• 1 "11 .. ..,. ... . . "".. -. ...S or ;:,r, primariJ.Y oecause or tneir Tflucn J.onger naJ.r-J.ives. J.ne annuaJ.
rate cf movement of these isotopes is very low due to the formation of radio-
coloids. Typical mean distances of travel would be of the order of 1500 m.
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Tab1e 13 Tank Leakage Recorded by the USAEC /67 /
Leak date Tank TypeI) Years in
Service
Approx.
Leakage
(m3 )2 )
137Cs
I~elease (kCi)
Fai lure 3
Hechanism )
1956 A 9 200 0.09 SS
1::J57 B 2 0 0 SC
1958 A <1 60 8 SS
1959 A 6 80 2 PC
1959 A 13 110 23 PC
1959 B 3 0 0 SC
1959 B 2 0 0 SC
1959 B < 1 <4 <0. 1 SC
1%0 A 7 130 4 PC
1962 A 7 10 17 SS
1963 A <) small SS11
1964 A 8 small SS
1965 A 10 small S5
1965 A 7 190 40 SS
1969 A 13 110 45 SS
1969 A 21 260 51 PC
1969 B 14 0 0 SC
1971 A 17 unknown PC
1972 B 12 0 0 SC
1972 A 16 unknown PC
1973 A 30 440 40 unknown
I)A-Carbon steel-lined concrete tank
B-Carbon steel tank inside partially steel-lined concrete vault
2)Average tank capacity ~3000 m3
3)S8: structural stress
PC: pitting corrosion
SC: stress corrosion
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All of the tanks that have developed leaks to date were earbon steel tanks.
Sinee 1954 stainless steel tanks have been 1n use. None of these tanks have
shown evidence of deterioration. In addition, the wastes in all these tanks
has been alkaline. l~wever,because of longer tank service life, signifieantly
smaller quantities of wastes, better feed for further treatment, and eost
analyses fuel reproeessing acid waste storage will be preferable. Therefore,
it is not proper to deduee any eonelusions eoneerning the future safety of
liquid tank storage from the past reeord exhibited in Table 13 .
2) Loss of eooling
The loss of eooling aecident would be, most likely, the aeeident resulting
in the most hazardous release of radioaetive materials. The worst possible
time for this aceident to oecur would be when the storage tank was newly filled
and the heat generation rate at its peak. The heat generation rates for
the wastes from the various reactor types are given in Table 14 • For our
eonsiderations here we may assume that our storage tank is located at a
1500 MT/year reproeessing plant. A representative tank capacity is 3500 m3•
At a eontinuous filling rate, the tank would be filled to capacity in slightly
more than 2 years. Assuming \.0 m3 cf high-level liquid waste per ton of
fuel reprocessed, the average heat generation rate in the tank would be
3~9 kw/m , or 31.5 MW total for the tank. For safety reasons these tanks would
be provided with a mimimum of two independent cooling systems.
However,if for some reason the eondenser and filter were out of service
and the eooling systems were not able to funetion the contents
of the tank would self-boil in a matter of a few hours. The possible eauses
of the loss of service of the eooling and ventilation facilities would be
I) loss of powe r
2) flood, hurricane, earthquake, sabotage
3) operation error or neglect.
The wastes would boil to dryness in something of the order of 100 hours,if
they are acid, or roughly twice as long if they are alkaline. If the wastes
were still contained at this time a temperature of more than 1000 oe would
be reached in the center of the tank.
The volatile eomponents of the wastes would be released to the atmosphere
from the self-heating wastes. Because of their relatively low vapor pressure,
most of the released activity would be due to cesium and rutherium. These
components, together with the total fission product activity, are given in
Table 15 as a function of the time since reprocessing for three different
'fable 14
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Beat Generation Rates for Characteristic Radioactive Wastes
(kilowatts per metric ton fuel reprocessedJ
Time sinc: 1)
Reprocess1ng
(year) 0 3 5 10 30
Waste from:
PWR (Eq.Uranium) 21.0 8.2 3.2 1.8 1 • 1 0.6
PWR (Pu-recycle) 23.5 9.2 3.8 2.4 1 .6 0.8
LHFBR (UlR-Pu) 28.2 10.4 3. I 1.5 0.8 0.5
LH1".6R (FBR-Pu) 27.'1 10.5 3.2 1.6 1 .0 0.6
HTGR 29.9 11.2 5.2 3.5 2.3 1.3
233 29.0 10.7 3.3 2.3 1.3THTR ( U-recycle) 4.9
I)Reprocessing of fuel iSO days after discharge from reactor
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Table 15 Important Volatile Components in Radioactive Wastes
(curies per metric ton of fuel reprocessed)
Time sinc7 I)
reprosess:lng
(year) 0 3 5 10 30
PWI<. (Eq. Uranium)
106Ru 4.18+5 2.10+5 5.27+4 1.33+4 4.22+2 4.29-4
134 Cs 2.24+5 1.60+5 8. 12+4 4.13+4 7.62+3 9.02
137Cs 1.10+5 1.07+5 1.02+5 9.77+4 8.71+4 5.48+4
Te(total) 1.98+4 3.81+3 1.57+3 9.39+2 2.60+2 1.53
Total fission products: 4.38+6 1.69+6 7.04+5 4.59+4 3.20+5 1.86+5
LHFBR (LWR-Plutonium)
106Ru 9.33+5 4.68+5 1. 18+5 2.96+4 9.41+2 9.57-4
134 Cs 1.90+4 1.36+4 6.90+ 3 3.51+3 6.47+2 7.48-1
137Cs 1.15+5 1.13+5 1.08+5 1.03+5 9. 15+4 5.77+4
Te(total) 3.91+4 9.35+3 4. 14+3 2.47+3 6.82+2 4.02
Total fission products: 6.32+6 2.29+6 8.32+5 4.71+5 2.87+5 1.61+5
(no 233IiTGR U-recyc1e)
106 9.26+4 4.65+4 1. 17+4 2.94+3 9.35+1 9.51-5Ru
134cs 4.69+5 3.34+5 1.70+5 8.64+4 1.59+4 ! .89+ I
137Cs 2.07+5 2.02+5 1.93+5 1.84+5 1.64+5 1.03+5
Te(total) 4.53+4 7.47+3 2.65+3 1.56+ 3 4.33+2 2.55
Total fission products: 6.34+6 2.42+6 1.22+6 9.08+5 6.84+5 3.99+5
1) .
of fuel 150 days after discharge from reactorReprocess:lng
waste streams. Assuming
the figures in Table 15
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1m3 of liquid waste for each ton of fuel
3
would be than per m of tank waste.
reprocessed,
Blomeke and Emerson /65/ estimate that during the self-boiling phase of the
accident ,.wi thout the condenser and fil ter in service, something 0 f the order
of 300 Curies of rutherium and 10 3 curies of other fission products would
be released per minute, assuming acid wastes. Over aperiod of 175 hours
90% of the rutherium, cesium, and tellurium as weIl as 5% of other fission
products will have bee~ released. In our case this would represent arelease
j
to the atmosphere of a~~ut 1.9x109 curies. For alkaline wastes these figures
would be considerably reduced, of anlorder of magnitude.
I?
To properly analyze this accident within the framework of risk it will be
necessary to calculate the probability and time,after reprocessing,of the
accident occurring. This could be handled with a fault tree analysis of the
tank storage facilities.
3) Hydrogen Explosion
The intensely radioactive Purex concentrates cause radiolytic decomposition
of H~O. The rate of production of hydrogen is such that if the ventilation
"-
system failed, the lower explosive limit of 4% hydrogen in air would be
reached in a matter of hours. Sufficient quantities could accumulate which
could explode with a force sufficient to rupture the tank and concrete
encasement. This would probably cause, additionally, a 1055 of coolant for
the wastes. If the tank was so ruptured that the wastes were still contained
the accident would proceed as in the pure loss of coolant accident. However
effective remedial action would be more difficult in this case. The more
likely condition is that the tank would rupture such that some or much of
the contents would seep out into the soil. This would greatly reduce the
impact of the accident.
4) External Causes
There are numerous externally created incidents which could lead to releases
of the wastes from the tank. The most important of these are the events
created by severe weather conditions, such as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes,
etc. In additio~ there is always the possibility of sabotage. The most susceptible
portion of the storage facility would be the surface 10cated coolin~: and
ventilation systems. In this case the accident would proceed as illustrated
in the 10ss of cooling accident explained above. Rowever, if the external
causes were to rupture the tank directly the wastes would seep into the ground.
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C2. Storage of Solid Wastes
The possible causes of tank failure given in the previous seetion for
storage of liquid wastes are applicable to the storage of solid wastes
exeept that no radiolytie hydrogen formation is possible, therefore
the possibility of a hydrogen explosion does not exist.
The leakage of aetivity from containers holding solid wastes could be
causedby defective sealing, by release of overpressure built up in-
side the container, or by abnormally high eorrosion rates. In any ease
the leakage rate would be slow from the solid, and could be detected
by monitors so that remedial action eould be taken.
The loss of coolant aeeident would probably be the most severe aceident
in asolid waste storage faeility, as in the ease of liquid storage.
However, sinee the wastes would be at least several years older than
the liquid wastes, due to the time lag in solidifieation after repro-
cessing, the heat generation rates per unit volume would be eorres-
pondly smaller. In addition, the waste may be combined in the solidi-
fieation proeess with an amount of inert material. Therefore, the like-
lihood that the waste could reach the melting point of stainless steel
is small. If the waste container does fail, by overheating or by rup-
turing from collapse of the surrounding structure, the volatile com-
ponents of the wastes would be released to the atmosphere from the
molten wastes. Again the released activity would be due primarily to
cesiumand rutherium.
Release rates of volatile elements from ceramic wastes have been meas-
ured to be of the order of 0.5 to 1.0% of the content per hour. A typ-
ical solid waste container would contain, roughly, the wastes from one
to three tons of reprocessed fuel. Assuming the wastes have aged five
years before theyare solidified, our typical waste container would
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contain approximately 3.0x10S curies of cesium and rutherium. There-
fore, the release from one container would be of the order of 3000
curies/hour. For younger wastes the release rate would be corres-
pondingly higher.
The rate at which the 1055 of coolant accident would progress depends
on the mode of cooling. In an air cooled facility theaccident would
progress much more rapidly than in a water cooled facility because
of the absenceof water to evaporate. It is also likely that in an
air cooled facility the waste containers would be smaller and spaced
at larger distance. Therefore, the atmospheric release would be some-
what smaller.
The nonvolatile components of the wastes would, in any event, remain
in the storage facility. If the floor of the storage facility was
ruptured they would seep into the soil and be subject to leaching
by water.
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VI. Evaluation of Risks from Waste Management and Disposal
Normaily at this stage one would expect that a combination of the methods
illustrated in section 111. of this report with the data presented in sec-
tions IV. and V. would yield the sought after values. However, this is
presently not possible due to the lack of sufficient data from a complete
detailed analysis of the various waste disposal schemes. In addition, as
obvious from the remarks in section V. there appears tobe no one single
optimum waste disposal scheme, but rather one would believe that an op-
timum strategy would consist of a combination of two or more of the
schemes. We should not overlook the fact that in a consideration of the
various waste disposal schemes, a particular scheme may require the sup-
port of other waste treatment and handling activities. The risks due to
the support activities must be added to the risk due to the disposal
scheme itself. For example, in the salt deposit concept the waste will
be stored for aperiod as a liquid, be solidified, stored again as a
solid beforebeing deposited in. the salto Each of these activities have
a risk associated with it. In the plowshare concept these activities
are not necessary, therefore to leave them out of the overall considera-
tion of the risk from disposal in salt deposits would be toneglect a
component of its risk.
Realizing th~t it is not possible at present to werk forward in risk
analysis of waste disposal schemes, as outline in the preceding sec-
tions, one could work backwards. In other words, by setting a particu-
lar risk standard one could search for the necessary criteria to be
maintained to meet the risk standard. These criteria would be deconta-
mination factors in waste processing facilities, and upper permissible
limits on accident probabilities. To illustrate this approach we shall
treat the problem of disposing of solidified wastes in a sal t deposit.
We shall assume a nominal spent fuel throughput of 1500 t/yr. The wastes
from the reprocessing of these 1500 t of fuel per year will be stored
5 years as a liquid, solidified, and stored an additional 5 years be-
fore being brought into the salt deposit. In addition, the average an-
nual aeolian dilution (X/Q) is 10-7 sec/m3 for air and for groundwater
-j . 3(X/Q) is 10 sec/m. The chain of activities we shall consider is il-
lustrated by the following diagram. The risk from both normal opera-
I Hig~-level !
i L1qU1d Waste /'
, Storage I
f
High-level
~ Waste
Solidification
High-level
--~ Solid Waste
Storage
Final
Waste
, -~--~ Disposal
Facility
tional releases, if there are any, and accident conditions are consid- ,
ered. The risk standard, given as a maximum offsite dose, can be ar-
bitrarily set at 30 mrem/yr. for the normal operational releases from
any one facility and also for the expected accident risk from each
facility.
Normal Operational Releases
..
The only square in the flow diagram above that would have normal opera-
tional releases is the waste solidification facility. There are at pre-
sent several different processes under investigation for the solidifica-
tion of the high-level wastes. G~nerally the semi-volatiles such as
ruthenium, cesium, selenium, tellurium and technetium can be off-gased
because of the high temperatures used. It is possible, in some cases,
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to add substances to the waste which form thermally stable components
~ith cesium. The release of ruthenium may be reduced by denitration of
the waste solution.
As a function of the decontamination factor the maximum average annual
offsite doses, based on a conservative assumption that 1/10 of the ICRP
recommended maximum permissible concentration in air (with the lung as
the critical organ) are given in the following table. It i8 worth men-
tioning that a decontamination factor of 2000 is reported for the cal-
Table 16 Estimated Offsite Doses from
the Semi-Volatiles Released
During Waste Solidifieation
(mrem/yr.)
Deeontamination
Faetor
2000
PWR
Fuel
958
4.79
0.48
LMFBR
Fuel
2820
14. 1
1.41
cining process at the Idaho Chemieal Proeessing Faeility. Therefore,
for a throughput of wastes from 1500 t/yr.of spent fuel, assumed
here, a signifieant improvement in the deeontamination faetor is re-
quired to meet our eriterion of 30 mrem/yr. A required deeontamina-
1\
tion faetor would be of the order of 10-.
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Aeeident Conditions
1) Liquid Waste Storage Assuming that the liquid wastes are stored
for 5 years between fuel reprocessing and
waste solidifieation, the total waste quantity in storage at any given
time for a J500 t/yr. throughput would be
1500 t/yr. ~ 1 WU/t ~ 5.0 yr. ~ 7500 WU
where WU = one waste unit and represents the total quantity of high-
level wastes from the reproeessing of one ton of spent fuel.
For the upper permissible aceident limit we shall assume that all of
the semi-volatile radionuelides and 5% of the remaining fission pro-
duets are released to the atmosphere. The aecident is assumed to take
plaee at the midpoint of the total liquid waste storage period (2.5
years). Rather than ealeulate separately for the PWR and LMFBR ease,
we shall use only the larger risk value, per unit waste, in the fol-
lowing eonsiderations. At 2.5 years after fuel reprocessing the added
sum of the ratio of euries to the eorresponding MPC values for the
radionuelides released in the assumed aeeident is
L
i
= 1.48 x 10 15 ",3/wua
The ealeulation of the upper limit aeeident probability, to yield an
expeeted risk of 30 mrem!yr., is as foliows:
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Solving for P
p[l/sec] < 5.4 x 10- 14 -1sec
p[l/year] -6 -)or < 1.7xlO yr.
Assuming a tank capacity of 3000 WU, the accident probability per tank
per year is
P < 4.3 x 10-5 yr.- 1 -1tank •
2) Waste Solidification Facility As mentioned previously, the waste
solidification is assumed to take
place 5 years after fuel reprocessing. Our upper limit accident is as-
sumed to be a total release to the atmosphere of all the semi-volatiles
radionuclides. In addition we assume that 1/200 of the annual throughput
would be involved in the accident, i.ee 1/200.1500 WU • 7.5 wu. At 5 years
after fuel reprocessing
• 5 .91 x 10 14 3/WUrYla
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for the semi-volatiles in the waste. The upper accident probability
is calculated as foliows:
-I
sec
p < -34.3 x 10 -1yr.
3) Solid Waste Storage Solid waste storage is assumed to be for a
per iod of 5 years after solidification and
before final disposal. Therefore a total capacity needed for a facility
would be for the wastes from 5 years of reprocessing 1500 t/yr. of spent
fuel. Again, for the upper limit accident we assume a total release to
the atmosphere of all the semi-volatiles present in the wastes and that
the accident would occur at the midpoint of the total storage time (7.5
years after fuel reprocessing). In this case our ratio curies to MPC
values is, per volume waste unit (WU)
•
and the accident probability
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1.45 x 10- 13 -1sec
P < -1yr.
Assuming that an individualwaste cylinder contains the wastes from
2.5 t of reprocessed fuel, the accident probability per year per
cylinder is
P < -3 -1 -11.4 xl0 yr. cylinder
To summarize, the permissible upper limits ofthe accident probabilities,
assuming an expected accident risk of 30 mrem/yr., are collected in Table 17.
Table 17 Permissible Upper Limit
of Accident Probabilities
Facility
Liquid Waste Storage
Waste Solidification
Solid Waste Storage
Probability
4.3 x 10-5 -1 -1yr. tank
4.3 10-3 -1x yr.
10-3 -1 cylinder-11.4 x yr.
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From these considerations it appears that the most stringent safety
requirements have to be meant in the liquid waste storage. As men-
tioned in section V.Cl. one has to engineer against the permanent
loss-of-cooling accident.
Final Waste Disposal Facility Accident
As we have done previously we can also attempt here to find an upper
limit of the accident probability which would give us an expected
accident risk of 30 mrem/yr. This is much more complicated here be-
cause of the time dependence of the hazards of the waste (see sec-
tion IV.) and the continuous accumulation of the waste in the facil-
ity. However, one would expect that if the wastes were added to the
facility at a constant annual rate an equilibrium value of the hazard
index would be ultimately reached. The equilibrium value would only
be a function of the annual rate of addition and the hazard index of
this amount. The approach to an equilibrium value i8 shown in Fig. 29
for the case of a constant yearly addition of a quantity of waste
having an initial hazard index of BI • 4.14 x 10 11 m3• The equili-
w
brium value is reached in 800 years and is roughly 21 times the
constant yearly addition. However, 95% of the equilibrium value is
achieved in only 190 years.
The advantage of using the equilibrium value in our calculations is
that the time dependence drops out of our problem and that it is not
necessary to consider the total quantity of wastes stored. The per-
missible limit of the accident probability so calculated, for the
equilibrium value, would be then the true upper limit.
The hazard index of the waste composition at 10 years after fuel
reprocessing is, as defined by Eq. (2) in section IV.,
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HI .. 3m IWU.
'IN
With our assumed throughput of 1500 t/yr. of spent fuel reproeessing
the annual addition rate to the disposal faeility would be J500 WU/yr.
Therefore the equilibrium hazard index aehieved in this ease is
.. 2.13 x 10 11 m3 /WU • 1500 WU • 21
w
.. 6.75 x lotS m~
The leaeh rat~ measured for various typ~s of solidified wastes ranges
-4 -7 2typieal1y from 10 to 10 gm/em /day. If we utilize the upper value,
-4 210 gm/em /day, and assume the waste cylinders to be 20 em in dia-
meter with a density of 3.0 gm/ern3, the fraction of the waste leached
by water is ealeulated to be
f
'"'
It is unreasonable to assume that if an accident does oeeur in the
waste disposal facility that all waste cylinders would be simultan-
eously exposed to a leaching action of water. One would suspeet that
the probability a certain fraetion of the waste cylinders be exposed
to water in an accident would exhibit a behaviour, on a log-log scale,
as shown in Fig. 30.
Fig. 30
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Probability vs. Fraction of Waste Exposed in an Accident
In the following calculation we shall use the product P+F as the
parameter, assuming an expected risk of 30 mrem/yr. Therefore
-1 r 3]where we have assumed (X/Q) of 10 Lsec/m for ground water and have
neglected any filter action of the ground soil solving for P.F
-61.15 x 10 •
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VII. Systems Approach to Waste Management (Suggestions and Direc-
tions for Continued Effort)
As noted throughout the discussions in the preceding sections of this
paper. each particular waste disposal concept has associated with it
problems (or hazards) which would not have been encountered if that
particular concept was not utilized. In addition. it appears that there
is no one single optimum disposal concept. Rather a combination of two
or more concepts may be ultimately optimum. This leads one naturally
to the conclusion that a proper consideration of the overall problem
of risk evaluation. and reduction or optimization. must be considered
from a system point-of-view.
In addition. as emphasized many times in the preceding sections. this
paper is not intended to present solutions to the problem of radio-
active waste management. Rather it is to serve to point out the im-
portant points in the field and the areas in which effort is needed
to solve some of the many still existing problems. Several years of
concentrated effort will be needed to resolve the primary issues of
the problem as outlined in the following.
In the following we present and outline the suggestions for contin-
ued effort in this field in the form of a system model approach to
the problem.
System Model
A model for the overall consideration of risk evaluation for nuclear
energy is given in Fig. 31. In the sense that risk is used in the
following we shall always be referring to total risk due to nuclear
energy. i.e. from nuclear reactors. fuel reprocessing facilities.
as weIl as from waste treatment and disposal facilities. The in-
dividual boxes in the flow diagram of Fig. 31 are discussed below.
1) Energy Needs: The driving force of our entire system iSt
of course. the energy demands of the segment of the population
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Fig. 31 Systems Approach to Evaluation of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Risks
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being considered in our problem. Accurate predictions of future
energy demands is essentially impossible (see discussions in
section 11 Band Ref. /3/). However, gloh~l trends for our pro-
blem may be sufficient, as done in Ref. /7/, an input for this
study. Nevertheles~ the inputs here should be continually ex-
amined to check their reasonability. It is important to con-
sider here the relative contributions of the total energy pro-
duction to electrical, residential and commercial, industrial,
and transportation requirements.
2) Nuclear Energy Production: The portion of the total
energy needs (demands) produced by nuclear energy are esti-
mated. In some respects the feasibility of technological
developments must be assumed or assessed, as for example the
application of high-temperature gas cooled reactors for process
heat production, that is, use of nuclear energy aside from only
electrical energy production.
3) Nuclear Reactors and Associated Fuel Cycle Industry: From
the total nuclear energy production it is necessary to assess the
distribution of reactor types among the total required to cover
the demands. Again the feasibility of technological developments
is important. For example, the possible introduction of the
carbide fast breeder reactor could be important because of its
lower plutonium inventory. In addition to the distribution of
the reactor types, the corresponding unit sizes, their respective
sites, and environmental protection equipment is necessary. For
example, the requirement to scrub iodine from the off-gas ef-
fluents would not only affect the overall plant efficiency,
thereby reducing the number of kilowatt hours produced per unit
"risk", but it would result in a concentration of the material
which in itself may be more hazardous than the simple continuous
release of the material to the atmosphere. This is also true
for the effects of reactor sites in relation to the average
distance to energy use. Increased transmission losses increase
the amount of radioactive material produced per kilowatt-hour
actually"used".
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In addition to the reactors, the site and S1ze of the fuel
fabrication and reprocessing facilities are also important. The
transportation of fuel, both fresh and spent, must be also
considered.
4) I'roduction and Characteristics of Radioactive \.,rastes:
Even today it is difficult to generalize about the production
and characteristics of wastes produced by reactor operation
since the reactors are not off-the-shelve products. In addition,
the characteristics of wastes produced in fuel reprocessing
facilities are to some extent unknown. For example, in the
ERD there is presently only a small experimental fuel repro-
cessing facility, designed to accept low burn up fuel, in
operation. There is also not a great deal of experience in the
large scale production of plutonium fuel elements, which will
undoubtedly represent a significant portion of the fuel element
fabrication in the future. Efforts 1n this area will entail
a continuing effort of data collection and appraisal.
5) Analysis-State of Technology: Before any concept of a
waste treatment and disposal facility can be appraised it is
necessary to assess the state of the art of our technological
capabilities, as applicable to the various proposed concepts.
For example, the state of the art in the production of solidi-
fied wastes, and their characteristics, is of primary importance.
To mention a few others, the present day ability to decontaminatea
waste stream and cleanly separate particular fractions of the
waste stream is of interest in all concepts.
6) Technological Realizations: Again we come into an area
requiring a certain degree of prediction capability on our part.
The accuracy withwhich the tasks in this area can be accomplished de-
pends directly on how weIl we did our homework in the preceding
task, number 5. What is needed here is a prediction of our abil-
ity to meet certain required technological states of development,
for the various proposed waste management schemes, at the re-
quired time. The required time is a function of the predicted
accumulation of the wastes (task 3).
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7) Waste Treatment and Disposal System: In essence this segment
represents a refinement of what we have done in section V of this
paper. That is, the characteristics of the various proposed
waste management schemes must be carefully classified. Possible
weak points in the schemes must be identified as weIl as events
which could lead to subsequent releases of radioactive materials.
The time periods in which the events could occur is important
for the determination of the relative hazards of the various
components of the waste. For example, the actinides are not
readily reconcentrated by organisms, nor do they move fast
through food chains, in contrast to some fission product ele-
ments. An attempt to assess the probability of occurrence of
the possible events leading to radioactive material releases is
also necessary. Also important for an optimum selection of a
scheme, or schemes, is the associated cost for the scheme.
8) Critical Review of Existing Radiation Exposure Limits:
As pointed out in section IV of this paper the present day
radiation exposure limits, or for that rr~tter the permissible
concentrations of radioactive material in liquid and gaseous
effluents of a facility, are not directly applicable for our
problem. It is of paramount importance to consider the rela-
tive ease with which the various isotopes move through our
environment and the extent to which they are reconcentrated by
organisms. These factors must be considered in evaluating
existing radiation standards for use in the assessment of waste
management schemes.
9) Hazard Potentials (Risk): A combination of the input
data from tasks 7 and 8 leads to an assessment of the hazard
potentials of the various segments of each particular waste
management concept.
l~) Input-Output Model with Cross Coupling: To rationally
consider an energy system composed of multiple stages, and
interconnected to other energy systems, it is necessary to
develop a mathematical formulation for the system. A very
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easy means of doing this is by application of the "input-
output" model approach common in the field of economic and
operational research. Such a model for the evaluation of the
environment impact of energy systems has been developed by
Maxim and Brazie /69/.
The idea behind the model is that a particular energy system is
considered as a chain consisting of aseries of stages (acti-
vities). The nuclear energy chain would look, very simply, as
the following:
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Each particular stage of the energy chain \vould be represented
as depicted in the diagram below.
Input from last
stage 0 f -s-a-m-e-c""':h:""a"'"":"i-n-..........
Inputs from
other chains
Pollutants
useful
output
r.onversion
losses
All the inputs and outputs of the stage can be expressed as
relations of the primary input to the stage (see Ref. /69/).
For the purpose of evaluating risk we would need to slightly
extend the model by considering the damaging effects of the
pollutants released. The importance of the release rates of
the pollutants,the Ioeation of the release (site of the
facility), the climatie eonditions, etc. are not to be over-
looked. With thistype of representation of the energy
system the overall effeet of a particular "environmental pro-
tection" measure can be evaluated. It ii; '!,ossible that the rE'-
duetion of riSk (pollutant release) 1n one, stage may elevate
the total risk of the energy system.
11) System Model: The input data, from task 9, are uti-
li~ed in the system model developed in task 10 to deseribe
the total energy risks.
12) Risk from Entire Energy System: The efforts in this
task involve an interpretation of the results from all the
above tasks. At this point an attempt is made to assess
whether the estimated risk is acceptable, not only to the
system analyst but also to theiipublic ii , whoever they may be.
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In the event that it is assessed that the risks are not
acceptable then the various segments which could be altered
for risk reduction must be identified. For example t it may be
possible to alter various portions of the waste treatment and
disposal systems to achieve the necessary risk reduction. At
the very highest level constraints on certain portions of the fuel
cycle activities could be levied.
13) Suggestions for Research and Development Programs: Based
on what constitutes the final selected full nuclear fuel cycle
system with associated waste treatment and disposal schemest
the necessary R + D work to achieve the proposed concepts would
be outlined.
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VIII. Conclusions
From what is written in the introduction of this paper, there
should be no "conclusion" for this paper. In the true sense of
identifying an optimum waste management stratety and its asso-
ciated hazards (risks) there is no conclusion. However, in the
sense of the problem there are many conclusions. Offhand it ap-
pears that there will not be a single optimum waste management
strategy, but rather a combination of strategies. The technol-
ogy for the realizations of the strategies is, for the most
part, still to be achieved and demonstrated.
Many of the inputs for a total risk evaluation still need to
be identified and quantified, and what is presently available
needs to be refined considerably. A combination of methods
from the area of the physical sciences and Operations Research
appear to suffice for the purpose of seeking an optimum solu-
tion to the problem of radioactive waste management.
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Abbreviations
UJR
B\oJR
LHFBR:
HTGR
THTR
BRD
Ci
KCi
HCi
MWD/T:
kw
Hw
GW
kg
Pa
u
Np
Pu
Am
Cm
DF
HI
light water thermal reactors consisting of 50% pressurized
water and 50% boiling water reactors
pressurized light water reactor
boiling light water reactor
liquid metal (sodium) cooled fast breeder reactor with oxide
plutonium fuel
high 23~perature gas cooled therw~l reactor operating with
a 93% U fuel
2~§h temperature gas c~~5ed thermal reactor operating with
U recycle fuel and U makeup
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany)
curie (3.7 x 1010 disintegrations/second)
kilocurie (curie x 103)
megacurie (curie x 106)
burnup designation l.n megawatt days per ton (1000 kg) of fuel
kilowatts (watts x 103)
megawatts (watts x 106)
9gegawattes (watts x 10 )
kilograms (grams x 103)
element symbol for protactinium
element symbol for uranium
element symbol for neptunium
element symbol for plutonium
element symbol for americium
element symbol for curl.um
decontamination factor
hazard index of radioactive wastes
Q.
~
HP I i
x
P.
~
i i
a , b :
F.P.
cm
m
km
MT
ICRP
wu
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symbol for amount of curies of a particular quantity of
radioactive isotope ~
maximum permissible concentration of isotope i ~n water
(x=w) or air (x=a) for general population
maximum permissible ingestion (x=w) or inhalation (x=a) of
isotope i for the general population, per year
physical half-life of isotope ~
0.693/T~
probability of isotope ~ leaving a waste disposal site and
reaching man
weighting factors used in the definition of a hazard index
(FI) for radioactive wastes
fission products
centimeter
meter
kilometer (m x 103)
metric ton (1000 kg)
International Commission on Radiological Protection
waste unit, the quantity ef high-level wastes frem the
reprocessing of one ton of spent year
cubic meters of water (x-w) or air (x=a)
